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TAX COMPLEXITY AND TECHNOLOGY 
 





 The federal income tax code has become increasingly complex over time 
with the implication that many taxpayers no longer understand the connection 
between their life decisions and their taxes.  Some commentators have suggested 
that increasing computational complexity may be attributable in part to the 
proliferation of tax preparation software that renders such complexity 
manageable at filing time, but otherwise does nothing to mitigate the “black box” 
nature of the tax system. While such complexity and opacity undercut explicit 
incentives embedded in the Code, make planning more difficult, and undermine 
political accountability for taxes, they may also reduce the inefficient distortion 
or deadweight loss of the income tax, particularly with respect to higher-income 
taxpayers. 
 
This Article argues that technology represents a potential response to tax 
complexity and opacity as well as a contributing factor.  It argues that tax 
planning software can and likely will be used to restore “functional 
transparency” to the Code, for good or bad, alerting taxpayers to explicit 
incentives, allowing taxpayers to easily determine the tax consequences of their 
life decisions, and providing a means for improving fiscal citizenship, but also 
highlighting tax burdens in such a way as to increase deadweight loss.  This 
Article also makes the case for government provision of planning software 
targeted at lower-income taxpayers in order to level the planning playing field 
and improve the take-up of tax incentives by this population, while avoiding 
facilitating social welfare reducing tax planning by higher-income taxpayers.  
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 It is well known that the federal income tax code has become increasingly 
complex over time with the implication that many taxpayers no longer understand 
the connection between their life decisions and their tax obligations.  The tax code, it 
is sometimes said, now resembles a black box. 1  Some commentators argue that 
increasing computational complexity of the Code is attributable in part to the 
proliferation of tax preparation software.2  The idea is that tax provisions requiring 
complex calculations, such as phase outs of deductions or credits or the alternative 
minimum tax, would have encountered fierce resistance in the past when most 
taxpayers filled out forms by hand, but now that most filers use tax preparation 
software such as TurboTax or employ professional preparers who use such software, 
this computational complexity is trivial and acceptable.3   
 
 The increasing complexity of the Code has pros and cons.4  On the positive 
side, a more complex tax system can increase accuracy in the sense of drawing 
sharper distinctions between taxpayers along relevant metrics, such as ability to pay.  
Plus, to the extent that complexity reduces the salience of income taxes or leads 
taxpayers to systematically underestimate their effective marginal tax rates 
(EMTRs), 5 this complexity may reduce the inefficient distortion, known as excess 
burden or deadweight loss, that arises when taxpayers shift their behavior away from 
a taxed good or activity, in this case labor, to an untaxed activity, in this case leisure.   
 
 But there are a number of downsides to this complexity driven opacity.6  If the 
complexity leads taxpayers to systematically over-estimate their EMTRs, this feature 
would increase the inefficient distortion of the income tax.  But even if increased 
opacity has the opposite effect of reducing excess burden, there are several negatives.  
The tax code contains many explicit incentives and subsidies.  Incentives are less 
effective if taxpayers simply responding to prompts from TurboTax do not recognize 
them.  Similarly, complexity and opacity increase the difficulty of factoring taxes into 
major life decisions, such as buying a house or having children.  A more complex and 
opaque tax system may make it easier for Congress to obfuscate tax burdens and 
reduce political accountability for taxes.  It is even possible that complexity and 
                                                        
1 Zelenak (1040 book) ch. 2. 
2 Zelenak (1040 book) ch. 2.   
3 Zelenak (1040 book) ch. 2. 
4 Infra Part x. 
5 I use EMTR to denote the actual impact of the next or last dollar of income on an 
individual’s tax liability and to distinguish this from the statutory marginal tax rates 
(STRs) that are easily found from tax tables or online.  STRs are sometimes referred 
to as tax brackets.   As discussed infra Part x, EMTR is the appropriate tax rate for 
most decision making.  Both EMTR and STR should be distinguished from the average 
tax rate (ATR), which is total tax divided by total income. 
6 Infra Part x. 
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opacity could result in suboptimally large government through the “fiscal illusion” 
that taxes are lower than they are in actuality. 
 
 To be sure, whether these positive or negative effects of complexity and 
opacity are real or just theoretical depends on a number of factors.7  Do taxpayers 
respond to EMTRs, or to what they believe to be their EMTRs?  Does salience of 
taxation affect behavior?  Do taxpayers systematically under- or over-estimate 
EMTRs or are their errors random?  How does/would increasing complexity affect 
these estimations and responses?  There is a large literature on these questions, and 
they remain somewhat unresolved.  In short, however, the evidence suggests that 
taxes do affect behavior, but salience matters, as one would expect.  Taxpayers, 
particularly high-income taxpayers, appear to systematically underestimate EMTRs, 
and one would expect that the provisions of the Code that affect marginal rates, such 
as deduction phase outs, more often lead to under-estimation of EMTRs than the 
reverse.  Thus, while there are many open empirical questions, it seems likely that 
today complexity and opacity result in a tradeoff between reduced excess burden of 
taxation, on the one hand, and impaired tax incentives, personal planning and 
optimization, and perhaps political accountability, on the other. 
 
 But need this be the case, and will this continue to be the case?  While a number 
of commentators have argued that technology is a leading culprit in this story, this 
Article argues that technology will also provide the response – that technology can 
render the income tax black box functionally transparent and to some extent will do 
so whether so doing is in the overall interest of society, or not.8 
 
 This is the first academic article to look closely at tax planning software, as 
opposed to tax preparation software. 9  At the extreme, the latter renders the tax 
system opaque by reducing the taxpayer to a clerk who simply inputs figures from 
various documents when queried by the software.  Out pops a net tax amount owed 
or tax refund figure with little or no insight into how that amount was determined.10  
Tax planning software, on the other hand, can be designed to allow taxpayers to easily 
run “what if” scenarios, adjusting inputs to determine the tax impact of various life 
decisions, such as starting a family, taking a higher paying job, sending a kid to college, 
etc.  When integrated with preparation software, tax planning software could also be 
designed to alert taxpayers to various tax incentives, explaining, for example, that an 
earned income tax credit (EITC) recipient can take home more than a dollar from an 
increased dollar in wages, that education credits may be available for a child nearing 
                                                        
7 Infra Part x. 
8 See infra Part x. 
9 See infra Part x. 
10 This is a bit of a caricature of tax preparation software.  In reality, the realms of tax 
preparation and planning software overlap considerably.  For example, both 
preparation and planning software serve an educative function but preparation 
software tends to do so in a generic fashion while planning software can better tailor 
advice and education to a particular taxpayer’s situation.  See infra TAN x. 
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college age, or that charitable contributions will have no tax impact if the standard 
deduction will exceed a taxpayer’s total itemized deductions.   
 
The general idea here is that what is important is that taxpayers understand 
the impact that their life decisions will have on their tax burden, not that they 
understand the mechanics of, e.g., the earned income credit phase out.  Throughout 
this article I refer to the ability to make connections between life decisions and tax as 
functional transparency. 
 
Does tax planning software serve this function today?11  Yes and no.  Planning 
software currently marketed to individual taxpayers is too simplistic to create 
functional transparency.  These products appear to serve as little more than 
marketing devices for the tax preparation software companies that provide them.  
However, the planning software marketed to professional preparers is generally 
much more sophisticated.  The best products facilitate detailed “what if” scenario 
analysis and generate recommendations tailored to individual taxpayer situations.  
Combined with the knowledge and foresight of professional preparers, these 
products could create functional transparency.  Somewhat surprisingly, however, the 
limited empirical evidence suggests that the taxpayer clients of professional 
preparers may be less knowledgeable about taxes than other taxpayers.12 
 
For this and a number of other reasons, I am somewhat skeptical about the 
prospects for commercially available tax planning software.  If enough high-income 
taxpayers see value in piercing through the black box, one would expect the 
promulgation of planning software aimed at individual taxpayers and that the use of 
planning software would expand more generally.  But will the private goals and 
incentives driving these developments match public goals?  Will commercially 
available products optimally highlight tax incentives?  Will these products be 
available at a price affordable to low-income taxpayers?  Will commercial tax 
planning software facilitate cheating?  And, of course, even if commercially available 
tax planning software works perfectly, functional transparency undermines the 
potential positive impact that opacity has on reducing the excess burden of the 
income tax.  
 
Indeed, there may be a case for government intervention in the tax planning 
software market, perhaps even for government provision of such software. 13  
Software could be designed to further the government’s objectives in addition to 
furthering taxpayer objectives by, for example, highlighting explicit tax incentives 
incorporated in the Code.  Ideally, this software would be targeted at taxpayers at the 
lower-end of the income spectrum in order to level the tax planning playing field 
                                                        
11 See infra Part x. 
12 The proffered explanation is that some taxpayers who enlist professional preparers 
delegate tax compliance to these professionals and as a result have little grasp of the 
intricacies of taxation.  See infra Part x. 
13 See infra Part x. 
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between low- and high-income taxpayers, address the particular complexities 
associated with low-income tax situations, and avoid undermining the efficiency 
benefits of opacity at the high-end of the income spectrum.   
 
Suppose, for example, that the federal government were to adopt a pre-
populated tax return scheme for lower-income taxpayers along the lines of 
California’s Ready Return experiment. 14   While pre-populated returns would 
massively reduce compliance burdens, they would likely heighten the black box 
nature of the tax system for participants.  Taxpayers taking advantage of pre-
populated return filing could be offered simplified tax planning software – perhaps 
smartphone based – to help offset the increased black box effect, or such software 
could be provided to low-income taxpayers generally if these taxpayers were priced 
out of the commercial tax planning software market.  Targeting government provided 
planning software at low- or low- to middle-income taxpayers would have the added 
bonus of not facilitating social welfare reducing planning by high-income taxpayers. 
 
To be sure, even government provision of tax planning software would not 
necessarily resolve all of the issues arising from the increasing complexity and 
opacity of the Code.  Would the mere availability of such software sufficiently address 
the political accountability, fiscal citizenship, and even personal planning concerns 
arising from opacity?  Would it be a sufficient response to these concerns that 
taxpayers could readily associate their life decisions with their tax burdens, even if 
they did not choose or pay to do so?15 
 
In my view, technology-driven responses to the increasing complexity and 
opacity of the Code are probably inevitable.  The important questions are who gets to 
shape these responses – commercial concerns or the government – and what does the 
answer to that question mean for fairness, democracy, and efficiency? 
 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows… 
 
II. The Increasing Complexity and Opacity of the Federal Income Tax 
 
 There is widespread agreement that the federal income tax code has become 
increasingly complex over time and increasingly opaque to individual taxpayers.16  
This Part will define the terms “complexity” and “opacity” as I intend to use them in 
                                                        
14 As discussed infra Part x, a taxing authority may “pre-populate” tax returns using 
data reported by third parties, such as wages, and distribute these returns to 
taxpayers who may sign and file the return or provide their own return instead. 
15 These questions are asked in somewhat greater detail but are only provisionally 
answered infra Part x. 
16 Whether the Code is too complex for the job is debatable.  See Ruhl & Katz at 195.  
Ruhl & Katz also distinguish between a legal system being complicated, which the 
Code clearly is, and being complex in the sense of interdependence between its 
elements.  As will be apparent, this Article uses complexity in its more general sense. 
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this Article and discuss their sources and growth.  This Article focuses on the 
individual federal income tax.  While the corporate income tax may also suffer from 
increasing complexity, I assume that corporations generally have the resources and 
incentives to deal with the complexity and do not experience the same pathologies as 
individual taxpayers.  I may be wrong about that, but if so, that must be the subject of 
another article. 
 
 Complexity, it has been remarked, is complex. 17  Tax complexity has been 
broken down into numerous subcategories.18  This Article is chiefly concerned with 
two types of complexity – computational complexity and planning complexity.  In 
analyzing the take-up of the EITC, Jacob Goldin defines computational complexity as 
the difficulty of determining one’s eligibility for a tax benefit and the amount of that 
benefit and distinguishes computational complexity from informational complexity – 
the difficulty of acquiring the information needed to determine a tax benefit.19  Both 
of these types of complexity fall within a larger category known as compliance 
complexity, which may be distinguished from tax planning complexity – the cost or 
difficulty of arranging one’s affairs in response to tax rules.20   
 
 The alternative minimum tax (AMT) has long been seen as the paradigm of 
computational complexity.  Although the reach of this provision was significantly 
curtailed by the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), taxpayers potentially subject to 
the AMT must essentially calculate their taxes twice – once using the regular set of 
inclusions, exclusions, deductions, and tax rates and the second time using modified 
AMT inclusions, exclusions, deductions, and rates.  Close behind the AMT as the poster 
children for computational complexity are the myriad phase outs in the Code of 
various deductions, credits, and exemptions.   
 
 All of this computational complexity increases the opacity of the tax code for 
individual filers and makes it more difficult to include tax consequences in one’s 
planning.  Taxpayers may be aware of the EITC but not be aware of whether, given 
their income, they are eligible for the maximum credit, some fraction of the maximum, 
or no credit at all.21  Taxpayers on the cusp of the AMT may not know whether various 
                                                        
17 See, e.g., Tran-Nam at 242 (observing that “tax simplicity (and hence its mirror 
image, tax complexity) is itself a complicated notion”). 
18 See, e.g., Thomas, User Friendly, at 1514 (surveying the literature and describing 
rule-based complexity, computational complexity, structural complexity, and 
compliance complexity). 
19 Goldin, EITC at 74, 81. 
20 Goldin, EITC, at 73-74, n. 77.   
21 The EITC is a refundable tax credit.  The design includes a phase-in range across 
which recipients receive a credit equal to a percentage of earnings up to a maximum 
credit level, a plateau across which the credit – the maximum credit – does not vary 
with income, and a phase-out range across which the credit declines at a fixed 
percentage of income.  The phase-in and phase-out percentages are a function of the 
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potential tax deductions for, e.g., state and local income taxes or real estate taxes, will 
reduce their ultimate tax liability.  None of these taxpayers may have an accurate 
conception of their EMTR and the after-tax implications of marginal adjustments to 
income or various expenses.  
 
 Another closely related concept is tax salience.  As Deborah Schenk describes, 
salience refers to the visibility or prominence of a tax provision.22  Tax provisions that 
are more salient economically have a greater effect on taxpayer behavior.23  More 
computationally complex tax provisions are likely to be less salient.24   
 
 It is, I believe, universally agreed that the tax code has become more 
computationally complex over time.  Whether measured in terms of pages devoted to 
the federal income tax code and regulations or the amount of time expended in 
complying with the Code, complexity seems to rise inexorably.25  To be sure, the 
                                                        
number of qualifying children in the household.  See IRC §32; see also Goldin, EITC, at 
63-66 (describing the design of the EITC). 
22 Schenk, Salience Bias, at 254. 
23 Schenk, Salience, at 263.  Gamage and Shanske refer to this type of salience as 
market salience. 
24 Schenk, Salience, at 263.  Salience is related to the availability heuristic.  According 
to the availability heuristic as described by Tversky and Kahneman, individuals tend 
to “assess the frequency of a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which 
instances or occurrences can be brought to mind.”  Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
185 Sci. 1124, 1127 (1974).  One factor that affects availability is salience.  Id.  
McCaffery suggests that complexity acts as a multiplier on the availability bias.  
McCaffery at 1926.  For further discussion of the relationship between salience and 
the availability bias in the tax context, see Schenk, Salience, at 264. 
25 Andrew Lundeen, A Lot Has Changed in the 27 Years Since the Last Major Tax 
Reform, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 22, 2013), https://taxfoundation.org/lot-has-changed-27-
years-last-major-tax-reform/ (stating that between 1986-2013 the tax code has 
increased from less than 30,000 pages to over 70,000 pages); Annette Nellen & Jeffrey 
A. Porter, 30 Years After the Tax Reform Act: Still Aiming for a Better Tax System, J. OF 
ACCOUNTANCY, (Oct. 1, 2016), 
https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2016/oct/tax-reform-
act.html#:~:text=Since%201986%2C%20Congress%20has%20made,6%2F11%2F
12).(refrencing a press release from Sen. Max Bacus, then chair of the Senate Finance 
Committee stating between 1986-2012 “Congress made 15,000 changes to the tax 
code”); Scott Greenberg, Federal Tax Laws and Regulations are now Over 10 Million 
Words Long, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 8, 2015), https://taxfoundation.org/federal-tax-laws-
and-regulations-are-now-over-10-million-words-long 
 (stating “as of 2015, federal tax laws and regulations have grown to over 10 million 
words in length” and describing how the length has grown steadily over the past 60 
years from 1.4 million in 1955); Id. (“Americans spend 6.1 billion hours and $233.8 
billion complying with the tax code.”).  
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recently enacted TCJA included some simplifying changes.  By reducing the personal 
exemption amount to zero through 2025, the TCJA effectively suspended the phase 
out of personal exemptions.26  The TCJA also suspended through 2025 the phase 
down of itemized deductions for high-income taxpayers 27  and, by doubling the 
standard deduction, dramatically reduced the number of taxpayers who will itemize.  
Finally, the TCJA raised the AMT exemption levels and exemption phase-out 
thresholds, drastically reducing the number of taxpayers potentially subject to the 
AMT.28  Of course, only time will tell whether these reforms will stick.  Moreover, the 
TCJA ushered in an incredibly complex set of provisions – the §199A qualified 
business income deduction – which is now available to a large number of individual 
taxpayers.   
 
 There are undoubtedly many reasons for the complexity of the Code. 29  
Congress’s propensity for locating social programs in the tax code through enactment 
of tax expenditures certainly adds complexity.  Critics beginning with Stanley Surrey 
have lamented this use of the Code for a variety of reasons, including the resulting 
increase in complexity.30  On this score, I share the view of Jacob Nussim and David 
Weisbach that tax expenditures are not inherently objectionable, and that the tax 
system may be the most appropriate means of administering certain social programs, 
such as the EITC, for example. 31   But whatever one’s take on that question, 
undoubtedly tax expenditures add complexity.32   
                                                        
26 IRC §151(d)(5). 
27 IRC §68(f). 
28 Eastman (Tax Foundation) at 8 (reporting that these AMT reforms are expected to 
reduce the number of taxpayers paying the AMT from 5 million to 200,000). 
29 In addition to Congress’s propensity to situate social welfare programs in the tax 
code, Gale and Holtzblatt ascribe complexity to an unavoidable conflict between 
simplicity and fairness, to politics, and to the inherent complexity of the income tax 
base.  Gale & Holtzblatt (2002) at 181-83.  
30 Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: 
A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705, 731 
(1970) (arguing that “the tax system is complex enough as it is, and to have a large 
number of tax incentives side by side with the provisions making up the structure of 
the tax itself can only cause confusion and a blurring of concepts and objectives”).  
Surrey described a number of other disadvantages of tax expenditures including the 
“upside down” effect of subsidies framed as tax deductions as these are worth more 
to high-income individuals in high tax brackets than they are to low-income 
individuals who are in low brackets or who do not pay tax at all.  Id. at 720-24. 
31 David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 
113 Yale L.J. 955 (2004). 
32 THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL 33641, TAX EXPENDITURES: TRENDS AND 
CRITIQUES 13 (2006).  While many tax expenditure provisions arguably are 
appropriately situated in the Code, most tax expenditures include phase-out 
provisions that increase complexity.  These phase outs are justified as limiting 
benefits to low-income taxpayers, but as Daniel Shaviro has argued, this justification 
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 Larry Zelenak has argued that there may be a link between technology and 
computational complexity.33  His idea, as noted in the introduction, is that technology 
has reduced the cost to taxpayers of complying with complex tax provisions, which 
has made such provisions more palatable, and made it easier for Congress to enact 
complex provisions.  I do not know whether this is a testable hypothesis, but it strikes 
me as plausible. 
 
 However, while TurboTax and other tax preparation software products have 
reduced the cost of complying with complex provisions – have reduced 
computational complexity – they have done little to address opacity and planning 
complexity.  Taxpayers preparing their taxes on their own may simply input data on 
income and expenses following software prompts and easily arrive at a net tax 
amount owed or to be refunded, but this sort of blind use of tax preparation software 
renders the process a black box.  A taxpayer using these tools would not necessarily 
know, for example, whether her various expenses actually reduced her taxes or by 
how much.  To be sure, modern tax preparation software marketed to individuals 
typically includes tax tips that serve an educative function, but as discussed below, 
these are unlikely to produce much transparency.  Tax preparation software also 
reduces the compliance cost of taxpayers who enlist professional preparers, but 
again, this use of software is unlikely to illuminate the black box. 
 
 Another technological innovation – pre-populated return generation – shares 
these properties – reducing compliance costs but increasing or failing to reduce 
opacity in the face of complex tax provisions.  California experimented with pre-
populated return filing, known as Ready Return, in 2004 and 2005. 34   Taking 
advantage of the prevalence of third-party reporting of wage and salary income, 
California sent pre-populated state income tax returns to 50,000 taxpayers with the 
simplest tax situations based on prior years’ returns.35  The recipients were free to 
sign and file the pre-populated return or submit their own return instead.  The 
program was successful by most metrics with participation exceeding projections 
and satisfaction ratings in the high 90s. 36   Today, elements of Ready Return are 
incorporated in California’s CalFile electronic tax filing system, but Ready Return has 
                                                        
is flawed in the sense that a better, more efficient policy would be to eschew phase 
outs and adjust statutory marginal tax rates accordingly.  See Daniel Shaviro, 
Minimum Wage, at 408-09.  See also Zelenak, Complex Tax Legislation, at 113-16.  Of 
course, if adjusting statutory rates is politically impossible, tax expenditures with 
phase outs may be better than no tax expenditures at all.  See Shaviro at 409-10; 
Zelenak at 114-15. 
33 Lawrence Zelenak, Complex Tax Legislation in the TurboTax Era, 1 COLUM. J. TAX L. 
91 (2010). 
34 Bankman, Using Tech, at 783. 
35 Bankman, Using Tech, at 783. 
36 Bankman, Using Tech, at 784. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3685329




not achieved its promise, due in large part to opposition from the providers of tax 
preparation software.37   
 
 Despite the current setback, given increasing third-party reporting and 
advances in technology, one can imagine a future in which pre-populated returns are 
an option for a large number of taxpayers.  Some of these taxpayers will put in the 
time and effort to understand their tax situation and determine whether the pre-
populated return is correct.  But others are likely to simply sign and file the pre-
populated return.  For these taxpayers, compliance costs will be vanishingly small, 
but the tax system will likely be a complete black box yielding high planning 
complexity. 
 
 Looking further ahead, Joshua Blank and Leigh Osofsky envision a day in which 
artificial intelligence (AI) has developed to such a degree that taxes may be calculated 
automatically even for individuals with complex tax situations, obviously reducing 
compliance costs, but with the result that “the public stops understanding what the 
law is.”38  As with pre-populated return filing, in Blank and Osofsky’s world of return-
free compliance, computational complexity is likely high but the costs of managing 
that complexity are minimal.  Planning complexity, however, would seem to continue 
to be significant. 
 
III. The Pros and Cons of Increased Complexity and Opacity 
 
 While some will simply bleat “complexity bad, simplicity good”, in reality 
complexity is more complex than that.  There are benefits as well as costs to tax 
complexity, which are explored in this Part.  The primary benefit has to do with 
improving the efficiency of the income tax.  Thus, this Part begins with a brief 
introduction to efficiency analysis of income tax provisions and an exploration of 
taxpayer responsiveness to taxation, before considering the pros and cons of 
complexity and opacity, per se.   
 
                                                        
37 See Bankman, Nass & Slemrod at 481 (noting that elements of Ready Return were 
consolidated into CalFile in 2014); Joseph Bankman, Point & Counterpoint: Simplified 
Filing Would be a Boon for All Taxpayers, Not Just those who File the Simplest 
Returns, and Would Save Substantially on Filing Costs, 34 ABA: POINT & 
COUNTERPOINT (Aug. 26, 2016), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/taxation/publications/abataxtimes_home/1
6aug/16aug-pcp-bankman-maule-perspectives-on-two-proposals-for-filing-tax-
simplification/(discussing Intuit’s opposition to ReadyReturn and other similar 
systems); Joseph Bankman, Simple Filing for Average Citizens the California 
ReadyReturn, 107 TAX NOTES 1431, 1434 (2005) (discussing the tax preparation 
business’s opposition to ReadyReturn). 
38 Blank & Osofsky, ALG, at 9.   
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A. Efficiency of the Labor Income Tax39 
 
 Taxes affect behavior.  Most obviously, an individual who has $100 of income 
before tax will consume or save differently depending on whether she faces a tax of 
zero, $20 or $40, because taxes affect her wealth.  But this “income” effect of taxation 
is unavoidable if society is to fund public goods, and it is a function of the amount of 
tax raised, not the method.  In a revenue neutral analysis, e.g., we extract $20 of tax 
and return $20 in public goods, the income effect falls away.  Thus, efficiency analysis 
of taxation focuses not on the income effect of taxation but on a second effect – the 
“substitution” effect.40   
 
The substitution effect refers to the change in behavior resulting from 
differential taxation.  For example, our income tax taxes returns to labor (and savings) 
but not our enjoyment of leisure.  As a result, we work less and “consume” more 
leisure under a labor income tax than we would in a no tax world.  This makes sense; 
we are all maximizing our utility given the tax system we face, but this distortion in 
consumption patterns (not amount) reduces our aggregate utility beyond that simply 
associated with the income effect of taxation.  We would, taxes aside, prefer to work 
a little more and recreate a little less, but the tax on wages distorts that choice.  
Economists refer to this additional loss of utility resulting from the distortion in 
behavior as the excess burden of taxation or deadweight loss.41 
 
Consider a uniform lump sum or head tax.  Such a tax produces an income 
effect but no substitution effect because the tax is essentially unavoidable.42  It can be 
avoided only by dying or expatriating.  If we take these two options off the table, a 
lump sum tax does not distort taxpayer behavior beyond the change arising from the 
income effect.  Thus, a lump sum tax is an efficient tax that creates no excess burden.  
Of course, a lump sum tax is also patently unjust as it totally ignores an individual’s 
ability to pay taxes.  Real word taxes that are based on measures of income, 
consumption, or wealth, are fairer in that regard, but because they are by definition 
not uniform, they inevitably create substitution effects and excess burden.  In this 
decidedly second-best world, the efficiency goal is to minimize the distortion and 
excess burden for a given amount of revenue raised.43 
 
                                                        
39 See generally, Harvey S. Rosen, Public Finance; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economics of the 
Public Sector.  For helpful and concise discussions of efficiency analysis of taxation, 
see Nussim, Confuse and Protect, at 234-37; Weisbach, Line Drawing, at 1650-55. 
40 Weisbach, Line Drawing, at 1653-54, Nussim, Confuse, at 235. 
41 Weisbach, Line Drawing, at 1651 (“The deadweight loss of the tax is the loss in 
value to consumers in excess of the revenue raised by the government.”) 
42 Nussim, Confuse, at 236. 
43 Nussim, Confuse, at 237; Weisbach, Line Drawing, at 1653.  Obviously, there are 
other considerations in selecting or designing tax schemes including compliance costs 
incurred by taxpayers and enforcement costs incurred by taxing authorities.  These 
add to the total deadweight loss of taxation. 
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Under an income tax, the primary distortion that we are concerned about is 
along the labor/leisure front and the degree of distortion or excess burden in theory 
is a function of the marginal tax rate – the tax on the next or last dollar earned by the 
taxpayer – because it is the marginal rate that determines the relative after-tax value 
of labor and leisure and the distortions in behavior that arise from taxing the one but 
not the other.44  Importantly, however, the relationship between the marginal rate 
and excess burden is not linear; excess burden increases with the square of the tax 
rate.45   
 
B. Do Taxpayers Understand and Respond to Taxation? 
 
The forgoing all makes sense in theory.  But does it reflect reality?  Do 
taxpayers understand and respond to the economic incentives created by taxation?  
Are distortions real?  Because if taxpayer behavior is not distorted in actuality, taxes 
don’t create inefficiencies.  But the evidence suggests that while taxpayers don’t 
respond to taxes as perfectly informed rational economic actors, taxes do distort 
behavior.   
 
The primary distortion we would expect from a labor income tax is to labor 
supply.  Increasing taxes on labor should result in less work and more leisure.  
Economists capture the effect of taxes on labor supply by measuring labor supply 
elasticity – the effect of taxes on employment rates and hours worked.46  However, 
historically, studies have found fairly low labor supply elasticities along the intensive 
margin (hours worked), suggesting that hours worked are not terribly sensitive to tax 
rates.47  Of course, there are many possible explanations for this finding.  Perhaps, 
                                                        
44 Note again that I use the term “effective marginal tax rate” in this article to refer to 
a taxpayer’s actual marginal rate taking into account phase-in and phase-out 
provisions and similar adjustments and to distinguish this rate from statutory 
marginal rates or tax brackets. 
45 Weisbach, Line Drawing, at 1651; Feldstein, Tax Avoidance and Deadweight Loss, 
at 678, n.15.  It is difficult to explain exactly why deadweight loss is a function of the 
square of the tax rate, and the concept is generally demonstrated graphically using 
demand curves.  Deadweight loss is the area of a right triangle under a downward 
sloping demand curve with height equal to the amount of tax imposed and base equal 
to the reduction in quantity demanded given the tax.  If the tax is raised by an 
increment t’, there is an increase in both the height and base of the deadweight loss 
triangle.  Since the area of a right triangle is equal to (b x h)/2, and both b and h 
increase with t, deadweight loss increases with t2.  See Weisbach, Line Drawing, for 
an example of the graphical depiction of deadweight loss. 
46 Chetty (2012) at 971-72.  The effect of taxes on employment rates is known as the 
extensive margin elasticity and the effect on hours worked by those employed is 
known as the intensive margin elasticity.  Id. 
47 Saez, Slemrod & Giertz (SSG) at 3-4 (“the profession has settled on a value for this 
elasticity close to zero for prime-age males, although for married women the 
responsiveness of labor force participation appears to be significant”). 
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incentives to keep one’s job or to be promoted have more to do with labor supply than 
tax rates.  Raj Chetty has suggested that various frictions could explain low labor 
supply elasticities. 48  Or perhaps taxes affect labor supply but over a longer time 
horizon than can be captured in empirical studies.49 
 
In an important paper, however, Martin Feldstein argued that focusing on 
labor supply alone is too narrow a perspective and that all responses to taxes should 
be considered in evaluating the deadweight loss of taxation.50  Feldstein found, and 
later work confirms, that elasticities of taxable income (ETI) to tax are significantly 
larger than labor supply elasticities.51  For example, if taxpayers increase charitable 
contributions or contributions to retirement plans as tax rates increase, these 
distortions would be reflected in measures of ETI, but not in labor supply.  Emmanuel 
Saez, Joel Slemrod, and Seth Giertz caution that some ETI may simply reflect time 
shifting (my retirement funding example) or entity shifting (from individual to 
corporate form, for example) which represent tax-induced distortions but not of the 
type that create significant deadweight losses.52 
 
Other researchers have explored whether taxpayers respond to more discrete 
tax incentives created by “kinks” in the income tax schedule.  The federal income tax 
system includes numerous kinks – points at which the marginal tax rate changes 
abruptly – such as the point at which marginal income goes from being taxed at a zero 
rate to being taxed at a 10% rate, or the point at which an EITC eligible worker’s 
income subsidy is capped.53  In theory, if taxpayers are both aware of the details of 
the tax schedule and respond to these details by, for example, adjusting their labor 
supply, these kinks in the tax schedule should result in taxpayers reporting income 
that is bunched at the kinks.54   
 
In a 2010 paper, however, Emmanuel Saez finds very little evidence of 
bunching at kinks in the federal income tax.55  He finds some bunching at the first kink 
in the EITC schedule, the income level at which the EITC reaches its maximum level, 
and some bunching at the first income tax bracket kink (the point at which the 10% 
                                                        
48 Chetty (2012) 
49 Kaplow, Theory of Taxation and Public Economics 87-89 (2008). 
50 Feldstein, Tax Avoidance and Deadweight Loss (1999).   
51 Id.; SSG at 42 (the best available estimates of ETI range from 0.12 to 0.40). 
52 SSG at 10. 
53 Depending on whether an EITC recipient has qualified children and the number, 
her EMTR increases by between 7.65 and 45 percentage points at the point at which 
the credit is maximized. 
54 Raj Chetty and co-authors provide the following quote in explaining the rationale 
for the expectation of bunching at a large MTR kink point in the Danish tax system: 
“By the end of November, some of my colleagues stop working.  It does not pay 
anymore because they have reached the high tax bracket.”  Chetty et al (2011) at 760, 
n.12. 
55 Saez (2010). 
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rate kicks in) but little evidence of bunching otherwise.56  Moreover, he speculates 
that the bunching at the first EITC kink may reflect mis-reporting of income (i.e., 
cheating) rather than an actual impact on labor supply.57  On the other hand, Raj 
Chetty and colleagues do find substantial bunching at a very significant kink in the 
Danish income tax schedule.58  Saez speculates that the differences in outcomes of the 
two studies may have to do with the relative simplicity of the Danish tax system and 
the greater economic significance of the Danish tax kink.59 
 
Finally, there is survey and experimental evidence shedding limited light on 
taxpayer understanding of (but not responsiveness to) tax rate schedules. The bottom 
line is that most taxpayers lack a solid grasp on their EMTRs and, while some studies 
find over-estimation, most studies find under-estimation, particularly for high-
income taxpayers. In survey evidence reported in 1988, Fujii and Hawley found that 
of the 65% of subjects who reported an estimated EMTR, on average these 
respondents underestimated their EMTRs by about 3% points,60 a result that the 
authors characterized as evidence that taxpayers know their EMTRs (glass half full),61 
and which Emmanuel Saez characterized as evidence that taxpayers don’t know their 
EMTRs or report them with substantial error (glass half empty).62  In 1995, Rupert 
and Fischer provided survey evidence suggesting both over- and under-estimation of 
EMTRs based on a population of mostly low- and middle-income taxpayers.63  More 
recently, in 2015, Gideon tested taxpayer perception of their statutory marginal rates 
and found that low-income taxpayers tended to over-estimate their STRs, while high-
income taxpayers tended to under-estimate.64  However, EMTRs for both groups of 
taxpayers are likely to be less than STRs given numerous deduction and credit phase 
outs.65 
 
Several studies find that taxpayers frequently employ average rates in 
decision making instead of marginal rates.  Because ATRs are lower than MTRs in a 
progressive system, this error is essentially equivalent to under-estimation of 
                                                        
56 Saez (2010) at 181. 
57  Most of the bunching at the first EITC kink is associated with self-employed 
workers whose income is not verified by third party reporting.  Saez (2010) at 193. 
58 Chetty et al (2011) at 751. 
59 Saez (2010) at 182 (noting that the threshold for the top Danish income tax bracket 
is uniform for all individuals and that Danish taxes are based on individual (not 
family) income). 
60 Fujii & Hawley at 346. 
61 Fujii & Hawley at 346-47. 
62 Saez (2010) at 182. 
63  Timothy J. Rupert & Carol M. Fischer, An Empirical Investigation of Taxpayer 
Awareness of Marginal Tax Rates, 17 J. OF AM. TAX ASS’N 36 (1995). 
64 See Michael Gideon, Do Individuals Perceive Income Tax Rates Correctly, 45 PUB. FIN. 
REV. 97, 99 (2017).   
65 See infra TAN x. 
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MTRs. 66   In 1995 de Bartolme reported experimental evidence that subjects 
presented with a tax table that highlighted average rates but not marginal rates 
tended to use ATRs in decision making.67  Subjects presented with a tax schedule that 
highlighted marginal rates did not make the same error.68  Of course, today only about 
10% of taxpayers file returns without assistance and use the tables or worksheets 
provided by the IRS.  In a 2005 working paper, Feldman and Katuscak also found 
evidence, based on survey data, that taxpayers tend to use ATRs in place of MTRs, a 
result that the authors attributed to the complexity of the Code.69 
 
In an intriguing experiment reported in 2003, Rupert, Single and Wright found 
that subjects failed to adjust their estimates of their MTRs for floors and phase outs 
of deductions and credits and thus tended to underestimate their EMTRs.70  Subjects 
presented with less complex adjustments to STRs made smaller errors than those 
presented with more complex adjustments.71 
 
To be sure, several of these studies are quite old.  On the other hand, the Code 
is more complex and opaque today, which does not bode well for the level of current 
taxpayer understanding and use of marginal tax rates.  As further discussed below, 
the factors that make the Code computationally complex tend to reduce EMTRs below 
STRs, generally resulting in underestimation of EMTRs. 
 
In sum, it is clear that taxpayers respond to taxes.  Elasticities of taxable 
income to tax rates are significant and deadweight loss from differential taxation is 
real.  The accuracy of taxpayer perception of marginal rates and the speed and degree 
of responsiveness to changes in marginal rates remain somewhat open questions. 
 
C.  Positive Aspects of the Complexity and Opacity of the Federal Income Tax 
 
 With that brief primer on efficiency of taxation and equally brief review of 
evidence regarding taxpayer understanding of and responsiveness to taxes, we now 
consider how the complexity of the federal income tax could actually increase social 
welfare.   
 
 1. Increased Accuracy 
 
First, a more complex tax system can support a more accurate tax system that 
makes finer gradations between taxpayers based on relevant metrics, such as ability 
to pay.  As Louis Kaplow describes, a more accurate tax system improves the 
                                                        
66 Offsetting this effect to some degree is survey evidence suggesting that taxpayers 
systematically over-estimate ATRs.  See Ballard & Gupta (2018). 
67 de Bartolme (1995) at 80. 
68 de Bartolme (1995) at 80. 
69 Feldman & Katuscak (2005) at 2. 
70 Rupert et al (2003) at 73. 
71 Rupert et al (2003) at 79. 
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distribution of the tax burden making it “more likely that high-income individuals pay 
high taxes and low-income individuals pay low taxes.”72  Compare, for example, a 
lump sum head tax to even a rudimentary wage tax.  The latter is more complex, and 
while still far from perfect, obviously better recognizes ability to pay. 
 
But Kaplow focuses on another benefit of improving accuracy, which is that a 
more accurate tax is more efficient. 73  Because excess burden is a function of the 
square of the tax rate, errors in determining income that result in a higher tax rate 
cause greater increases in distortion and excess burden than is avoided by errors that 
result in a lower rate.74  Random errors, in other words, do not even out.  As a result, 
increasing accuracy reduces aggregate excess burden.75  This result holds, Kaplow 
notes, as long as taxpayers are aware of mismeasurement and act accordingly.76 
 
The accuracy theme has been repeated in more recent commentary that 
focuses on the potential for AI to disrupt tax design and assessment.  The idea here is 
that AI-based tools will eventually be able to quickly and inexpensively answer all tax 
questions incorporating all relevant tax materials – the Code, regulations, other 
written guidance, and caselaw.77  Commentators suggest that such technology could 
be used to generate optimal tax rules that yield greater revenue with minimal 
distortions. 78   While the underlying tax rules would be extremely complex and 
perhaps even individualized, the directives to taxpayers, e.g., pay $X, would be 
simple.79   
 
2. Reduced Deadweight Loss 
 
Of course, this AI-based tax system would be opaque, which leads to 
consideration of the potential benefits of complex and opaque tax provisions.  In short, 
such provisions can reduce the excess burden of the income tax if they lead taxpayers 
to either ignore taxes in their decision making, or to consider taxes in their decision 
making but to underestimate their EMTRs.   
 
One approach to a tax system that is a complete black box is to pay one’s taxes 
when due but to ignore taxes in decision making.  While ignoring taxes in decision 
making would have obvious drawbacks, which are considered in the following 
                                                        
72 Kaplow, Accuracy, at 62. 
73 Kaplow, Accuracy, at 63. 
74 Kaplow, Accuracy, at 63. 
75  Suppose, for example, that the accurate tax for each of two taxpayers is 10.  
Deadweight loss would be a function of 2 x 102 or 200.  Suppose instead that one 
taxpayer is taxed at 8 and the other at 12.  The total DWL in this scenario is a function 
of 82 plus 122, which is 208. 
76 Kaplow, Accuracy, at 63. 
77 Casey & Niblett, Death of Rules, at 1419; Alarie, Path of Law, at 443. 
78 Casey & Niblett, Death of Rules, at 1419; Alarie, Path of Law, at 443. 
79 Casey & Niblett, Death of Rules, at 1419; Alarie, Path of Law, at 443. 
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sections, doing so would reduce or eliminate the inefficient distortions that arise 
when individuals respond to taxes.80  
 
There is some evidence that individuals respond less to hidden or low-salience 
taxes.  For example, Chetty, Looney, and Kroft conducted an experiment in which 
certain products in stores were labelled with sales tax inclusive prices while labels on 
other products did not include sales taxes.81  Although consumers had an accurate 
understanding of sales taxes in the abstract,82 they reduced purchases of sales tax 
inclusive labelled goods relative to goods that lacked such labels. 83  The authors 
attributed this result not to information, but to salience and bounded rationality,84 an 
effect that Brian Galle refers to as “cognitive loafing.”85  Chetty, Looney, and Kroft also 
found in a separate study reported in the same paper that increases in beer excise 
taxes, which are included in posted prices, more greatly reduced demand for beer 
than did increases in beer sales taxes, which were not posted at the shelf but only 
added at checkout. 86   Similarly, Amy Finklestein found that the introduction of 
automated highway toll collection such as EZ Pass led to higher tolls, presumably 
because the elimination of toll collection at toll booths reduced drivers’ awareness of 
tolls or the salience of these tolls.87 
 
Commentators generally agree that low-salience taxes can be used to improve 
the efficiency of taxation by reducing distortions and deadweight loss.88   It seems 
unlikely, of course, that individuals would totally ignore the federal income tax.  But 
this isn’t what’s required for salience to matter.  Individuals may be fully aware of the 
income tax, but if the complexity and opacity of the Code reduce the salience of the 
tax at the time that these individuals make life decisions, that reduction in salience 
could lead to smaller distortions and deadweight loss.89   
 
Relatedly, Deborah Schenk argues that while the federal income tax is salient, 
in the sense of being prominent, distortions in behavior and deadweight loss may be 
limited if as a result of complexity and opacity individuals underestimate their 
                                                        
80 Goolsbee, TurboTax, at 20. 
81 Chetty et al (2009). 
82 The authors surveyed shoppers about sales tax rates and found that the median 
subject correctly answered seven of eight questions about the taxable status of goods.  
Chetty et al (2009) at 1165. 
83 Chetty et al (2009) at 1146. 
84 Chetty et al (2009) at 1147. 
85 Galle at 75. 
86 Chetty et al (2009) at 1146. 
87 Finklestein at 969. 
88 Galle, at 112; Gamage & Shanske, at 60; Schenk, at 255. 
89 This situation would mirror Chetty et al’s findings regarding sales tax salience.  
Shoppers were well aware of sales tax rules and rates but nonetheless responded 
differently when their attention was called to them in the shopping aisle.  Chetty et al 
at 1146. 
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EMTRs. 90   As discussed above, the limited survey evidence suggests that many 
taxpayers do not have an accurate understanding of their EMTRs and tend to under-
estimate, if anything.91  But this evidence is somewhat dated and limited, so let us 
return to theory. 
   
To the extent that taxpayers make an effort to understand their tax situation, 
would complexity tend to lead taxpayers to under- or over-estimate their EMTRs?  
One cannot be sure without more evidence, but two factors suggest that increasing 
complexity would be associated with under-estimation and thus with reduced 
distortion and deadweight loss, at least for middle to high-income taxpayers.  The first 
factor is the proliferation of deduction and credit phase outs and floors on various 
deductions under the regular income tax.   
 
In recent years, 92 numerous regular tax deductions and credits have been 
phased out (or down) with income, including the EITC, 93 personal exemptions, 94 
itemized deductions, 95  the dependent care credit, 96  the child tax credit, 97  the 
adoption credit, 98  the making work pay credit, 99  and various education 100  and 
retirement 101  deductions and credits. 102   The phase out of a deduction or credit 
increases a taxpayer’s EMTR above the statutory rate otherwise applicable.  Suppose, 
for example, that certain taxpayers are entitled to a $10,000 credit for some 
                                                        
90 Schenk at 273, 283.  But Schenk adds that “the conclusion that a low-salience 
income tax provision is efficiency-enhancing is not sufficiently robust to be the sole 
support for intentionally exploiting the salience bias.”  Id. at 284. 
91 See supra TAN x-y. 
92 As Zelenak notes, although “phase-outs became a significant feature of the income 
tax in the 1980s,” “the most dramatic growth in phase-outs occurred” in the 1990s.  
Zelenak (2010) at 106. 
93 IRC §32. 
94 IRC §151(d).  Suspended until 2025. 
95 IRC §68.  Suspended until 2025. 
96 IRC §21. 
97 IRC §24. 
98 IRC §23. 
99 In place in 2009 and 2010.  See Congressional Research Service, Withholding of 
Income Taxes and the Making Work Pay Tax Credit, 
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20130130_R40969_0e50564ebded07e5b21
af3f38e80928bdfc21714.pdf. 
100 These include the American Opportunity and Lifetime Learning Credits (§25A), 
the deduction for qualified tuition and related expenses (§222), the deduction for 
interest on education loans (§221), and the deduction for contributions to Coverdell 
Education Savings Accounts (§530). 
101 These include the so-called “saver’s credit” (§25B), and deductible contributions 
to traditional and Roth IRAs (§§219 & 408A). 
102 For a snapshot of current phase out provisions of the IRC, see Tax Policy Center 
Briefing Book, How Do Phaseouts of Tax Provisions Affect Taxpayers? (May 2020). 
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expenditure if their adjusted gross income (AGI) does not exceed $100,000, but that 
the credit phases down at a rate of 20c for each dollar of AGI in excess of $100,000, 
being reduced to zero for taxpayers with AGI of $150,000.  Also suppose that the 
statutory MTR applicable to all of these taxpayers is 25%.103  Within the phase-out 
range, for each additional dollar of income, taxpayers will lose 20c of their credit in 
addition to facing a tax of 25c.  Thus, the EMTR in the phase-out range will be 45%.104  
Taxpayers in this situation who focus on the statutory rate (the posted price, if you 
will), will under-estimate their actual EMTR, potentially reducing distortions in their 
supply of labor relative to the distortions that would occur under a fully transparent 
tax scheme. 
 
Floors placed on various deductions have a similar impact on EMTRs.  Medical 
and dental expenses, for example, are deductible only to the extent that their 
aggregate amount exceeds 10% of a taxpayer’s AGI.105  Suppose a taxpayer has AGI of 
$100,000 and medical expenses of $15,000.  $5000 of medical expenses would be 
deductible.106  But for each additional dollar of gross income, the taxpayer will lose 
ten cents of her deduction for medical expenses because of the ten-cent increase in 
the floor.  As a result, her EMTR will be 10% above the statutory rate.107  Again, if a 
taxpayer focuses on her statutory rate but is subject to a floor on deductions, she will 
underestimate her EMTR. 
                                                        
103 Most floors and phase outs in the Code are based on some measure of adjusted 
gross income, which is gross income less a certain set of specified deductions.  See, 
e.g., IRC §213(a) (setting a floor on deductibility of medical expenses at 10% of AGI); 
IRC §32(a) (phasing out the EITC based on a percentage of AGI in excess of a 
threshold). 
104 Because the phase out here is of a credit, the credit phase-out percentage and the 
statutory MTR can simply be added to calculate an EMTR. 
105  IRC §213.  Other deductions subject to floors include miscellaneous itemized 
deductions and casualty losses.  Miscellaneous itemized deductions, including 
unreimbursed business expenses of employees, are allowed only to the extent that 
their aggregate exceeds 2% of AGI.  IRC §67(a).  However, the deduction for 
miscellaneous itemized deductions is completely suspended through 2025.  §67(g).  
Deductions for net personal casualty losses of individuals are allowed only to the 
extent that their aggregate exceeds 10% of AGI.  IRC §165(h).  Through 2025, 
deductions for casualty losses are generally limited to losses from federally declared 
disasters.  §165(h)(5). 
106 Because the floor on the deduction would be 10% of $100,000, or $10,000. 
107 To keep things simple, suppose in this example that the taxpayer’s statutory and 
average tax rates are 25% and that medical expenses are the taxpayer’s only itemized 
deductions.  (These simplifications do not affect the analysis.)  At AGI of $100,000, 
taxable income would be $95,000 ($100,000 - $5000 deduction after the 10% of AGI 
floor), and tax would be $23,750.  At AGI of $100,001, taxable income would be 
$95,001.10 ($100,001 - $4999.90 deduction after the 10% of AGI floor), and tax 
would be $23,750.275.  In other words, a $1 increase in gross income increases tax 
by 27.5 cents for a 27.5% EMTR, 10% higher than the 25% STR. 
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Moving beyond the regular income tax, a second factor that in recent years has 
tended to result in EMTRs in excess of statutory rates is the alternative minimum tax 
(AMT).  Prior to the enactment of the TCJA, over 5 million U.S. taxpayers paid the 
AMT.108  The AMT is essentially a second tax system incorporating a broader base, 
large exemptions, and nominally lower tax rates.  But because the AMT exemption 
amounts phase out for higher-income taxpayers, EMTRs under the AMT are often 
higher than statutory rates.  The Tax Policy Center reported that about 77% of 
households subject to the AMT faced a higher EMTR in 2015 than they would have 
faced under the regular income tax.109  As Burman, Gale and Rohaly note, the idea that 
the AMT broadens the base and reduces rates is, or was, a myth.110 
 
As a result of these provisions, middle and upper income taxpayers whose 
EMTRs differ from their STRs more often face an EMTR that exceeds their STR, rather 
than the reverse. 111  And for these taxpayers it seems likely that complexity and 
opacity lead to under-estimation of EMTRs, on average, and to reduced labor supply 
distortions.112  In other words, the under-estimation of EMTR would mitigate the 
                                                        
108 Shuldiner (2018) at 498.  The TCJA reduced the reach of the AMT to about 200,000 
taxpayers in 2018, but the changes are due to expire at the end of 2025.  Barring 
further legislative action, the old AMT rules will be restored in 2026 and the provision 
is estimated to affect 6.7 million taxpayers in 2026.  Tax Policy Center, Briefing Book, 
Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System, AMT, What is the AMT? 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-amt. 
109 Tax Policy Center, Should the AMT Replace the Regular Income Tax? at 2.  See also 
Altshuler & Goldin at 335 (using the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center 
Microsimulation Model and estimating that 80% of AMT-paying taxpayers faced an 
EMTR in excess of their STR for 2009). 
110 Burman et al (Tax Notes 2003) at 115. 
111  Using 2010 IRS Statistics of Income data, Sherlock estimates that 42.5% of 
taxpayers in the 25% bracket faced an EMTR above their STR and only 1.8% below; 
that 54% of taxpayers in the 28% bracket faced a higher EMTR and only 1% a lower; 
and that 76.8% of taxpayers in the 33% bracket faced a higher EMTR and 9.6% a 
lower.  To be sure, because very high-income taxpayers would have fully passed 
through the AMT exemption phase out, only 3.6% of taxpayers in the 35% bracket 
faced an EMTR in excess of STR in 2010, while 45.5% faced a lower EMTR.  However, 
fewer than 1% of taxpayers were in the 35% bracket in 2010.  Note also that, like 
today, the personal exemption and itemized deduction phase outs were not in place 
in 2010.  Sherlock at 32.   
112 An important set of provisions of the TCJA complicates this picture somewhat.  
Newly enacted §199A provides a 20% deduction for the qualified business income of 
certain taxpayers.  For taxpayers entitled to the full deduction, this provision 
effectively reduces EMTRs by 20% of the STR.  A taxpayer who was unaware of this 
provision and focused on the STR would over-estimate EMTR and potentially over 
supply labor, all else equal.  However, the §199A deduction phases out with income.  
Section 199A eligible taxpayers within the phase-out range can face EMTRs well in 
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reduction in labor supply that would follow if high-income individuals understood 
their actual EMTRs and acted accordingly.   
 
For lower-income individuals the picture is somewhat more complex.  First, it 
is not only high-income taxpayers who experience EMTRs in excess of statutory rates 
and who would under-estimate their EMTRs if they focused on the latter.  Lower-
income individuals often face exceptionally high EMTRs as a result of a confluence of 
phase outs.  For example, examining 2010 data, Sherlock finds that 20% of taxpayers 
in the 10% statutory bracket faced an EMTR at least 10% points higher.113  In other 
words, for these taxpayers, EMTRs are twice statutory rates, or more.   
 
But two factors run in the other direction for lower-income taxpayers.  First, 
tax expenditures sometimes incorporate phase-in provisions that create wage 
subsidies across a significant income range for low-income taxpayers.  Consider the 
EITC.  The EITC phase in reduces EMTRs in a fashion analogous to the increase in 
EMTR that flows from the phase out.  For example, the EITC phases in at a 34% rate 
for taxpayers with one qualifying child.114  Within the phase-in range, these taxpayers 
receive a credit of 34 cents for every additional dollar earned.  Most of these EITC 
recipients face a zero statutory rate and thus an EMTR of negative 34% once the EITC 
phase in is factored in.115  Some recipients face a 10% statutory rate and a negative 
24% EMTR with the EITC phase in.  Individuals who fail to consider the EITC phase 
in might over-estimate their EMTR and work less than they would if their EMTR were 
transparent.  In this case complexity and opacity amplify the distortions of the labor 
income tax.116 
 
In addition, some studies have found that the tax rate that is most salient for 
individuals is the highest statutory rate.117  If low-income individuals make labor 
supply decisions based on this rate rather than their lower statutory or even EMTR, 
they will again under-supply labor amplifying the distortion of the income tax.  This 
is less of a problem for high-income taxpayers whose income places them in or near 
the highest bracket to begin with. 
 
                                                        
excess of STRs.  In these situations, of course, a taxpayer focused on her STR would 
under-estimate EMTR and potentially under supply labor.  See Libin Zhang, Marginal 
Income Tax Rates of the Passthrough Business Deduction, Tax Notes, May 21, 2018 at 
1139 (estimating that in the §199A phase-out range, EMTRs in 2018 can exceed 60%). 
113 Sherlock at 13.  See also Altig et al (2020) (taking into account phase outs of non-
tax benefits as well as phase outs under state and federal tax law and finding that one 
in four low-income workers faced EMTRs in excess of 70%). 
114 IRC §32(b). 
115 Likely as a result of the EITC phase in, Sherlock finds that 44% of taxpayers in the 
0% bracket in 2010 faced a negative EMTR.  Sherlock at 32. 
116 Similarly, the refundable portion of the Child Tax Credit phases in at a 15% rate 
for taxpayers with earned income above $3000.  See IRC § 24(d). 
117 Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1887 (1994). 
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* * * * * 
 
In sum, although the evidence that taxpayers tend to under-estimate their 
EMTRs is less than fully robust, it is consistent with the observation that the 
complicated phase outs of deductions, credits, and AMT exemptions are more likely 
to result in under-estimation than the reverse, at least for middle to high-income 
taxpayers.  To the extent that taxpayers respond to these lower perceived EMTRs, 
complexity and opacity likely reduce distortions and excess burden.  In this sense, 
complexity and opacity serve to increase social welfare. 
 
3. Deterred Cheating and Welfare-Reducing Planning 
 
 Transparency facilitates tax planning and certainly not all tax planning is 
welfare enhancing.  Indeed, David Weisbach argues that tax planning is worse than 
worthless.118  Tax planning, in his view, is equivalent to taxpayers doing backflips to 
reduce taxes.119  If everyone does backflips, the revenue raised from each taxpayer 
must be unaffected in equilibrium.120  The only difference, before and after, is all the 
backflips.  If only some taxpayers do backflips, these taxpayers impose externalities 
on those that abstain.121  While there are certainly exceptions, which even Weisbach 
notes, there is truth to his observation. 122  Given a fixed revenue requirement, a 
taxpayer’s expenditure of time and energy to reduce her taxes is socially wasteful.  
And whatever one thinks about “good” tax planning, some tax planning, equating to 
evasion or cheating, clearly is socially wasteful. 
 
 If transparency facilitates planning (including cheating) by laying out a 
roadmap for technical compliance or reported compliance, as some have argued, 123 
then complexity and opacity deter planning.  Consider the EITC.  An EITC recipient’s 
credit is maximized when her earned income reaches a certain threshold.  That 
threshold is an inflation adjusted figure that depends on whether the taxpayer has 
qualifying children and, if so, the number of qualifying children.124  Given the annual 
                                                        
118 Weisbach (Ten Truths) at 222. 
119 Weisbach (Ten Truths) at 222. 
120  Weisbach (Ten Truths) at 223 (“Holding government spending constant, 
everyone’s taxes are exactly the same with and without the backflip shelter, except 
that with the backflip, nominal taxes are higher and then are reduced by the tax 
gymnastics.”). 
121 Weisbach (Ten Truths) at 223 (viewing tax planning by some as an externality 
imposed on others). 
122 Weisbach (Ten Truths) at 224 (recognizing that changes in behavior intended to 
satisfy explicit tax incentives may be socially valuable).  See also, Viswanathan 
(arguing that low-income tax planning is often efficient). 
123 See, e.g., Casey & Niblett at 1420 (“If the law provides a clear rule and the regulated 
individual would prefer to circumvent that rule, then certainty provides a road map 
for avoidance”). 
124 IRC §32. 
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inflation adjustments, the threshold is a moving target.  Suppose a taxpayer with non-
wage income (and a less than finely tuned moral compass) decides that she would 
like to report income equal to the threshold in order to maximize her tax credit.125  If 
the threshold were a fixed, transparent, round number amount widely understood 
within the community, doing so would be fairly easy.  But it is much more difficult to 
hit an obscure moving target.  In fact, if one Googles “EITC” or “EITC maximum credit” 
one can quickly learn the maximum credit for a given year and the income level at 
which the credit completely phases out, but not the income level associated with 
achieving the maximum credit.126  One has to work very hard, I found, to uncover this 
critical bit of information.  
 
D. Negative Aspects of Increasing Tax Complexity and Opacity 
 
 Complexity can support a more accurate tax system and complexity and 
opacity can work to mitigate labor supply distortions and deadweight loss if 
taxpayers systematically under-estimate EMTRs and deter, or at least not promote 
cheating.  But there are many countervailing costs.  First, as noted above, if individuals 
systematically over-estimate EMTRs, this would amplify labor supply distortions and 
increase deadweight loss.  This scenario seems unlikely for high-income individuals, 
but possible for low-income individuals in the EITC phase-in range.  But even 
assuming systematic under-estimation of EMTR across the board and reduction of 
deadweight loss, there are a number of potentially offsetting negative factors. 
 
 1. Suboptimal Decision Making 
 
 Tax complexity and opacity could lead to suboptimal decision making.  Most 
obviously, systematic under-estimation of EMTRs may lead to individuals working 
more than they would if fully and accurately informed.  This may be personally 
suboptimal, but obviously this is just the flip side of reduced labor supply distortion, 
which we view as a plus.  But more generally, complexity and opacity impede basic 
tax planning and decision making that no one would find objectionable.  A taxpayer 
who is unaware of phase outs and under-estimates her EMTR may sock away less of 
her earnings in qualified retirement vehicles or give less of her money to charity than 
she would if she understood that the after-tax cost of these decisions was much less 
than she anticipated.  A taxpayer on the cusp of the AMT may be unable to determine 
the tax benefit associated with various expenditures, such as the property taxes she 
would pay if she purchased a home.127  Other opaque limitations on deductions or 
credits may result in taxpayers making suboptimally large expenditures on, for 
                                                        
125 Given third party reporting of W-2 wage income to the IRS, taxpayers reporting 
W-2 wages only have no real scope for mis-reporting their income for EITC purposes. 
126  EITC Maximum Credit, Google, http://google.com (search for EITC Maximum 
Credit and open the first several links). 
127 See, e.g., Zelenak (2010) at 103. 
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example, higher education or home improvements, without realizing that the 
purported tax benefits are limited or largely illusionary.128 
 
 2. Ineffective Tax Incentives 
 
 Many of the most complex tax provisions faced by individuals involve explicit 
tax incentives or subsidies that Congress has elected to implement through the 
income tax.  These incentives and subsidies include the EITC, education credits, and 
retirement savings incentives. 129   As Larry Zelenak notes, tax incentives are less 
effective if taxpayers don’t recognize them.130  The sheer number of incentives, their 
individual complexities, and the interplay between them 131  undermine taxpayer 
recognition, understanding, and take-up.  Commentators have recognized the tension 
between the general goals of reducing behavioral distortions and increasing the 
efficiency of the income tax, on the one hand, and promoting the goals underlying 
these tax expenditures, on the other.  For example, Jacob Goldin has remarked that 
raising awareness of the EITC creates a tradeoff between improving the effectiveness 
of the incentive and facilitating individual optimization and minimizing deadweight 
loss.132 
                                                        
128 Tax complexity and opacity could also potentially lead to suboptimal budgeting 
and consumption choices if individuals who under-estimate their EMTRs also under-
estimate their aggregate tax burden.  This possibility has received considerable 
attention in the context of low-salience consumption taxes.  Chetty et al (2009) at 
1173-74; Gamage & Shanske at 66-68; Nussim at 242.  Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 
provide an example in which a consumer purchases a certain car, unaware of a tax on 
the car purchase which will leave insufficient funds for necessities.  Chetty et al 
(2009) at 1174 (noting that the effect of inattention depends on how the consumer 
adjusts her budget in light of the tax, whether the consumer is credit constrained, 
etc.). Other commentators have questioned the significance of this distortionary 
income effect, however, and have argued that it is less likely to arise from mis-
perception of income tax rates.  Gamage & Shanske at 67-68 (arguing that given 
taxpayer learning these distortionary income effects are of limited importance unless 
low-salience taxes affect irregular expenditures and there are long delays between 
purchase and assessment of tax); Nussim at 254 (arguing that the potential 
drawbacks of misperceived consumption taxes generally do not apply to wage taxes 
given, inter alia, taxpayers’ ability to learn and respond to non-transparent taxation).  
Accurate withholding would seem to resolve budgeting problems even in the face of 
complexity and opacity.  I thank Leigh Osofsky for this observation. 
129 See supra TAN x. 
130 Zelenak (2010) at 103. 
131 To provide just one example, consider the interplay between the §21 dependent 
care credit and the §129 exclusion for employer provided dependent care.  The 
maximum amount creditable under §21 is reduced by any exclusion under §129. 
132 Goldin (EITC) at 106.  The EITC creates a tension because it includes a phase-out 
provision that increases EMTRs and reduces work incentives as well as a phase-in 
provision with the opposite effect.  See §32(a)&(b). 
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 3. Undermined Political Accountability and Fiscal Citizenship 
 
 The complexity and opacity of the Code enables Congress to purposefully 
obfuscate tax burdens, reduces political accountability, and undermines fiscal 
citizenship.  While it is often difficult to glean congressional motives from complex 
tax provisions, sometimes it isn’t.  Although temporarily in abeyance, the poster 
children for purposeful obfuscation of tax rates has to be the phase outs of personal 
exemptions and itemized deductions.133  The two are roughly similar in apparent 
intent and effect, so we will consider only the phase out of personal exemptions.   
 
 A deduction for personal exemptions – a set amount each year based on the 
number of individuals in the filing unit – has been a feature of the income tax since 
1913.134  Since 1985, the personal exemption amount for each member of the filing 
unit has been indexed for inflation,135 reaching $4,050 prior to the enactment of the 
TCJA.136  Between  1988  and 2009 and again between 2013 and 2017, the personal 
exemption amount was phased down or out for high-income taxpayers. 137  Why?  
There is no plausible reason other than as a hidden or low-salience means of raising 
additional tax revenue from this population of taxpayers.  The highest statutory MTR 
has high political salience.138  It is this number that citizens generally focus upon in 
considering whether “taxes” are too high, too low, or about right, and, of course, a 
significant fraction of the population generally believes the answer to be “too high.”  
Thus, it is no surprise that a means of raising additional tax revenue from taxpayers 
in the highest bracket, without adjusting that bracket, would be a means of avoiding 
political accountability for taxes and a particularly popular option for policy makers.  
And that is just what Congress has done, repeatedly, by phasing out personal 
exemptions and itemized deductions. 
 
 How might complexity facilitate this move?  If one can imagine a truly simple 
tax system focused on measuring income and including no tax expenditures, the 
                                                        
133 Technically, §68 phases down itemized deductions to a floor equal to 20% of 
itemized deductions before the phase down and was not truly a phase out.  However, 
I will refer to both as phase-out provisions for simplicity. 
134 https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-personal-exemptions 
135 Stephen J. Entin, Tax Indexing Turns 30, TAX FOUNDATION n.30 (Mar. 11, 2015), 
https://taxfoundation.org/tax-indexing-turns-30/.  
136 Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707 (providing inflation adjusted figures for tax 
years beginning in 2017). 
137 During some years the phase out was in effect, there were limits to the amount of 
reduction. For a detailed explanation see IRS, TABLE 23, U.S. INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX: 
PERSONAL EXEMPTIONS AND LOWEST AND HIGHEST TAX BRACKET TAX RATES AND TAX 
BASE FOR REGULAR TAX, TAX YEARS 1913-2015 (Sept. 18, 2015), 
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-historical-table-23. 
138 McCaffery refers to the highest rate bracket as being “socially prominent” and 
argues this prominence places constraints on legislators.  McCaffery at 1887, 1905. 
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enactment of phase outs of personal exemptions or itemized deductions would likely 
be a fairly transparent end run around statutory rate increases and for that reason 
might never have happened.  But given an already complicated Code with numerous 
phase outs of tax expenditure deductions and credits, the addition of two more phase 
outs may have seemed less exceptional and notable. 
 
 The personal exemption and itemized deduction phase outs are examples of 
purposeful obfuscation that both benefit from and increase tax complexity and reduce 
political accountability.  But tax complexity may undermine fiscal citizenship even 
when the effect is unintended.  In his excellent book, Learning to Love Form 1040: 
Two Cheers for the Return-Based Mass Income Tax, Larry Zelenak defends our 
broadly applicable, return-based tax system against critics such as Michael Graetz, 
who would prefer to return the income tax to its roots as a tax on high-income 
individuals only.139  Zelenak’s defense is based primarily on fiscal citizenship and the 
idea that the process of filing taxes encourages citizens to think more deeply about 
the tax system and about the fiscal state more generally.  Excessive complexity 
undermines fiscal citizenship, in Zelenak’s view.  “Taxation without comprehension,” 
he argues, “is inimical to fiscal citizenship.”140   
 
 4. The Leviathan and Fiscal Illusion Problems 
 
 Related to the forgoing, some commentators argue that complexity and 
opacity, particularly when remedied by black box software, may lead to suboptimally 
large government.  The idea here is that if taxpayers don’t comprehend their liability, 
if taxes are low salience, and if compliance is relatively painless; and if public goods 
are more salient, taxpayers may support a larger government providing more 
services than they would if all were transparent and clearly understood.141   
 
 These arguments stem from the Leviathan hypothesis and the theory of fiscal 
illusion.  As Edward McCaffery describes, 
 
                                                        
139 Zelenak (1040) (reacting to Graetz’s 2008 book titled, 100 Million Unnecessary 
Returns, A Simple, Fair, and Competitive Tax Plan for the United States). 
140 Interestingly, Zelenak is fan of pre-populated return systems, such as California’s 
Ready Return experiment.  In his view, the minimal requirement that citizens at least 
sign and return pre-populated returns is sufficient to engender fiscal citizenship. 
141 Milton Friedman publicly regretted his role in the introduction of the Federal 
income tax withholding system during WWII.  In Friedman’s view, the withholding 
system made the income tax less visible and more acceptable, leading to growth in 
government.  See Milton Friedman & Rose D. Friedman, Two Lucky People: Memoirs 
123 (1998).  See also, PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PUBLIC 
MEETING 119 (May 17, 2005) (statement of Grover G. Norquist, President, Americans 
for Tax Reform) (“[M]oving to a so-called return-free system will reduce people's 
understanding of what exactly they're paying and their [reduced] focus on it will 
make it easier to raise taxes.”).   
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The basic idea of the Leviathan hypothesis is that governments, or any 
bureaucracy generally, continually expand. It is as if a government 
were a living organism….  Fiscal illusion is a more specific theory that 
holds that individuals are likely to exaggerate the benefits and 
underestimate the costs of certain large public projects or public goods 
generally….  Taxes add to and enrich the basic fiscal illusion/Leviathan 
story.  Any degree of hiddenness in a tax structure plays directly into 
the prominence aspects of the fiscal illusion effect.142 
 
 While this fiscal illusion/Leviathan theory of the size of government is 
possible, Galle notes that evidence supporting this story is inconclusive.143  David 
Gamage and Darien Shanske argue that there is no baseline for determining whether 
the political salience of taxes is too high or low and thus that we can draw no useful 
conclusions about whether any relationship between tax salience and the size of 
government is socially valuable or costly, assuming that such a linkage exists at all. 144 
 
 5. Impact on Taxpayer Autonomy, Rights to Transparency, and Fairness 
 
 Related to the problem of impaired decision making, but broader, is a concern 
that complexity and opacity undermine taxpayer autonomy.  McCaffery, for one, 
questions the purposeful use of cognitive error, such as employing low-salience taxes, 
even in pursuit of noble, liberal goals.145  Joshua Blank and Leigh Osofsky note that 
the IRS has adopted a taxpayer bill of rights, which includes a right to be informed 
and a right to clear explanation of tax laws and IRS procedures.146  In contemplating 
a world in which technology may allow the production of tax returns with little or no 
input from taxpayers, Blank and Osofsky worry that “the public stops understanding 
what the law is,” which seems to run counter to the right to be informed.147 
 
 Finally, opacity and complexity will often lead to outcomes for taxpayers that 
many will view as unfair.  If taxpayers make expenditures that they reasonably expect 
will provide tax benefits, perhaps in response to specific incentives created by 
Congress, but later learn that the tax benefit was subject to an opaque limitation and 
thus was reduced or eliminated, this simply seems unfair.148 
                                                        
142 McCaffery at 1927-28 (citations omitted).  Finkelstein traces the theory of fiscal 
illusion to John Stuart Mill and notes the importance of James Buchanan’s work in this 
area.  Finkelstein at 970. 
143 Galle at 98. 
144 Gamage & Shanske at 79. 
145 McCaffery at 1943. 
146 Blank & Osofsky (2017) at 199; Blank & Osofsky (2020) at 16. 
147 Blank & Osofsky (2020) at 9. 
148  This situation can arise even with relatively straightforward code provisions.  
Itemized deductions, for example, provide tax benefits only to the extent that they 
exceed the standard deduction, in aggregate.  Thus, taxpayers who donate used 
vehicles to charity in response to advertisements touting tax benefits and later find 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3685329





E. Weighing the Pros and Cons and of Tax Complexity and Opacity 
 
 In terms of overall social welfare, complexity and opacity of the Code likely 
result in a tradeoff between reduced excess burden, on the one hand, and individual 
losses due to suboptimization and perhaps impeded political accountability, on the 
other.  Commentators vary in their assessment of the net impact on social welfare. 
 
 For example, Gamage and Shanske argue that reducing the economic or 
“market” salience of taxes is socially valuable because the reduction in distortions and 
deadweight loss is a first order effect while income effects, externalities, and 
distributional effects are second order.149  With respect to political salience, Gamage 
and Shanske are agnostic, emphasizing that there is no coherent baseline for 
determining the optimal political salience of taxes. 150   To be sure, Gamage and 
Shanske focus on salience, not complexity, and the additional downsides of 
complexity might suggest a different result for them.   
 
 Galle concludes that the social welfare effects of hidden taxes are 
indeterminate and that the answer depends, at least in part, on the mechanism 
through which taxes are hidden.151  Again, there is not one to one correspondence 
between complex taxes and hidden taxes, but significant overlap.  Schenk cautiously 
supports exploitation of low-salience taxes, primarily on political economy 
grounds.152  She is somewhat more cautious about the use of complexity to reduce 
salience given other costs to complexity.153 
 
 Zelenak, on the other hand, tends to focus on the downsides of complexity, in 
particular, the adverse impact on fiscal citizenship.154  McCaffery, as noted above, has 
expressed discomfort with purposeful exploitation of cognitive error, i.e., exploitation 
of complex and low-salience taxes, on both practical and moral grounds.155 
 
                                                        
that the tax benefit is small or nonexistent may feel aggrieved.  See Faulhaber, 
Hypersalience.  However, as long as the tax rules are straightforward and easily 
accessible, sympathy will likely be limited.  Once the complexity of the rules and 
interplay of rules creates a high degree of opacity, fairness arguments seem more 
compelling. 
149 Gamage & Shanske at 60. 
150 Gamage & Shanske at 79. 
151 Galle argues that “[h]idden taxes are likely progressive in a rational ignorance 
model, but regressive otherwise.”  Galle, at 64. 
152 Schenk at 284. 
153 Schenk at 286. 
154 Zelenak (2010);  Lawrence Zelenak, Justice Holmes, Ralph Kramden, and the Civic 
Virtues of a Return Filing Requirement, 61 TAX L. REV. 53 (2007). 
155 McCaffery at 1943. 
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 I am undecided on this question myself.  I am attracted by the potential 
reductions in labor supply distortion and cheating associated with complexity and 
opacity.  On the other hand, I do worry about suboptimal decision making and 
impairment of tax incentives, particularly at the low end of the income distribution.  
Although it simply reflects my own biases, I am less concerned about a high-income 
taxpayer under-estimating her EMTR and working “too much” as a result of deduction 
or credit phase outs or the AMT than I am about a low-income taxpayer missing out 
on the EITC. 
 
IV.  How Tax Planning Software Can (and Likely Will) Address the Complexity 
and Opacity of the Income Tax 
 
 Although it is important to understand the pros and cons of tax complexity, 
ultimately the question of whether complexity and opacity on net reduce or increase 
social welfare is somewhat beside the point of this Article.  The primary claim here is 
that technology can, and likely will, render the black box functionally transparent, at 
least for high-income taxpayers who are willing to pay the fare, for good or ill.  This 
Part discusses the potential of tax planning software to re-create transparency.  The 
following Parts evaluate currently available technology and make the case for 
government intervention in this arena and bring us back to the pros and cons of 
complexity, asking if we can preserve the pros while mitigating the cons. 
 
 I start with the proposition that the primary concern with a federal income tax 
black box is that taxpayers cannot readily understand the relationship between their 
life decisions and their tax burdens, which I refer to as a lack of functional 
transparency.  The problem is not that taxpayers can’t master the calculation of the 
phase out of personal exemptions, for example, but that taxpayers don’t understand 
how much of their next dollar of income they’ll keep after tax.  It isn’t that the EITC 
phase-in calculations are complex, per se, but that taxpayers don’t realize how much 
additional income they’ll receive on net from taking a higher paying job.  The problem 
isn’t so much the difficulty of wading through the plethora of mutually exclusive 
education incentives, as it is just knowing that tax incentives for higher education 
exist and estimating the tax benefit. 
 
 Technology can easily address these problems.  It can do so in three basic 
ways. First, tax planning software can be used to run “what if” scenarios illuminating 
the association between life decisions and tax.  Second, planning software can be used 
to alert taxpayers to tax incentives, both recurring and one-time incentives.  Third, 
and more generally, software can be used to educate taxpayers, to improve their 
understanding of the tax system from a functional perspective. 
 
A. Running “What If” Scenarios 
 
 Many of us use software to prepare our tax returns.  We input or download our 
various items of income and expense, and our withheld and/or estimated tax 
payments, and the software calculates how much additional tax we owe or the 
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amount of our refund.  And then we have a beer and celebrate the fact that that chore 
is done for another year. 
 
 But what most of us fail to realize is that we have also created a tool that could 
be used for tax planning.  Once all of this information has been collected, we could 
easily run “what if” scenarios to determine the marginal effect of our decisions.156  To 
be sure, what we have done is to create a baseline for the year past, not the year ahead, 
but for many of us, the past year is a reasonable starting place for thinking about the 
year or years ahead, and the tax impact of marginal adjustments to the past year’s 
data is likely to carry over to the next year.   
 
The range of “what ifs” is almost limitless.  How will my taxes be affected if I 
earn another $1000?  If I have another child?  If a donate a used car to charity?  This 
is the sort of information that taxpayers need in order to make decisions in an optimal 
fashion.  Of course, taxpayers who are fully informed in this fashion are more likely 
to adjust their labor supply to reflect their actual EMTR, which may not be socially 
optimal.  But at this stage I am evaluating what planning software can do to render 
the black box functionally transparent; not whether it should be done. 
 
As long as the relationship between life decisions and tax is a continuous 
function, “what if” scenario exploration should provide the information that 
taxpayers need to make those decisions effectively.  And generally, those 
relationships are continuous.  Phase outs are typically smooth.  Consider, for example, 
the phase out of the EITC.157  For taxpayers with two qualifying children, the EITC 
phases out at a 21.06% rate, that is, for each dollar of income above the phase-out 
threshold, these taxpayers lose 21 cents of credit until the credit vanishes.158 
 
Some tax provisions, however, create cliff effects that make planning 
somewhat more difficult.  For example, §222 provides up to a $4000 deduction for 
qualified college tuition and related expenses for single taxpayers with AGI of $65,000 
or less and a $2000 deduction for single taxpayers with AGI between $65,000 and 
$80,000.  A single taxpayer with AGI of $65,000 who added another $1000 of income 
would see her §222 deduction reduced by $2000, which would mean, all else equal, 
that $1000 of additional pre-tax income would result in $1000 less income after tax.  
Given the cliff and the many other factors that could effect on which side of the cliff 
the taxpayer fell, planning for this taxpayer is complicated.   
 
Nonetheless, in cases in which tax provisions create discontinuities, planning 
software could alert taxpayers who are near a cliff as to the issue.  For taxpayers far 
                                                        
156 If the software was designed to support “what if” planning.  Whether and to what 
extent commercially available planning software does so is the topic of the following 
Part. 
157 IRC §32. 
158 IRC §32(b). 
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from the cliff, the provisions are essentially continuous and no more problematic than 
smooth phase outs. 
 
B. Tax Incentive Alerts 
 
A second problem with tax system opacity is that taxpayers may mis-perceive 
tax incentives or even have no idea that certain tax incentives exist.  Here again, 
planning software can largely mitigate the problem by highlighting these incentives.   
 
Let’s return to our taxpayer who has just prepared and submitted her return 
using software that supports “what if” planning.  Suppose the taxpayer is an EITC 
recipient.  Of course, the taxpayer might run a “what if” scenario that would reveal 
her actual EMTR given her position along the phase-in, plateau, or phase-out range of 
the EITC,159 but the taxpayer might not think to do so.  Given the complexity of the 
EITC and the likelihood that a recipient’s EMTR will differ from her STR, planning 
software could be used to proactively alert and educate taxpayers as to the EITC.  The 
software could specify the break points in the EITC schedule for the following year, 
explain in simple terms the size of the tax subsidy or penalty in the phase-in and 
phase-out range, and provide generally useful information about the EITC, e.g., that it 
varies with number of kids and marital status, etc. 
 
Suppose a taxpayer has listed a number of itemized deductions but that the 
standard deduction exceeds (or is slightly less) than the total of itemized deductions.  
Again, the taxpayer might or might not run a “what if” scenario that reveals that her 
itemized deductions are not reducing her taxes (or reducing tax only minimally), but 
she might fail to do so.  Given this common situation, the software might be designed 
to affirmatively alert the taxpayer that only deductions in excess of $X for the 
following year will reduce her taxes.160 
 
Suppose a taxpayer lists a dependent child who is in her early or mid-teens.  
The taxpayer may be unaware of the various tax credits and other tax incentives 
available for higher education.  The child’s age could trigger an alert that highlights 
these incentives and directs the taxpayer to other sources for further information.   
 
                                                        
159 As discussed supra note x, the design of the EITC includes an income range across 
which the credit phases in and acts as a wage subsidy, an income range across which 
a recipient receives the maximum credit (the plateau), and an income range across 
which the credit is phased out.   
160 It is even conceivable that the software could explain that creating a donor advised 
fund and bunching charitable contributions into a single year could minimize taxes, 
given the TCJA increase in the standard deduction and other modifications to 
itemized deductions.  See, e.g., National Philanthropic Trust, Donor-Advised Funds 
and Tax Law Changes: Understanding How New Tax Law Changes May Impact Your 
Philanthropy (undated), https://www.nptrust.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/DAFs-and-Tax-Law-Changes-NPT.pdf.   
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C. Improving Taxpayer Understanding of the Tax System 
 
 In each of these cases, software could be used to mitigate the opacity and 
complexity of the Code, returning taxpayers to the level of understanding that they 
held when the system was simpler and most returns were prepared by hand.  But in 
some cases, the software potentially goes further, rendering the tax system more 
transparent and understandable than in the hand prepared return “golden age.”  And 
this brings me to the third way that technology can address complexity – by 
improving taxpayer understanding of the tax system from a functional perspective – 
a substitute for and improvement upon learning by doing.  
 
 One of the purported benefits of filling out tax returns by hand is that by so 
doing the taxpayer learns about the provisions that are applicable to her situation.  
This could very well be true for repetitive situations.  For example, a taxpayer might 
think that her $500 donation to the Red Cross would reduce her taxes, but after 
completing her return by hand, she might learn that the standard deduction was 
greater than her total itemized deductions, and as a result her donation provided her 
no tax benefit.  Going forward, she would understand this and potentially modify her 
behavior if the tax benefit was important to her.   
 
 But what about new situations?  The first year that a taxpayer preparing her 
own return by hand pays college tuition for a dependent child she may learn about 
education tax credits (if she is diligent), but she’s less likely to learn about education 
credits in the years leading up to her child’s matriculation when the prospect of the 
credit might have affected the decision of when and where to attend college.  In this 
situation, software that alerts taxpayers to potentially applicable tax provisions on 
the horizon is better than learning by doing taxes. 
 
 Another way that planning software could improve upon learning by doing is 
by mitigating common taxpayer errors.  Tax planning software can play an important 
role in distinguishing EMTRs from STRs in cases in which taxpayers are subject to 
various floors, phase ins, phase outs, or the AMT.  Well informed, economically 
sophisticated taxpayers will, of course, make incremental decisions based upon their 
EMTRs, but some research suggests that taxpayers fail to account for these 
adjustments.161  Other research suggests that some taxpayers fail to understand the 
basic difference between average and marginal tax rates and erroneously make 
decisions based on average rates. 162   As long as we have a tax system with a 
progressive rate schedule, which is important in maintaining progressivity, 163 
                                                        
161 See supra TAN x. 
162 See supra TAN x. 
163 A progressive rate schedule is not vital to progressivity.  Progressivity could be 
accomplished with a single tax rate and large uniform cash transfers or “demogrants.”  
See Bankman & Griffith at 1945 (stating that one result of the optimal tax model is 
that “a progressive tax is best implemented through demogrants combined with 
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marginal tax rates will exceed average rates on ordinary income, and the potential for 
mis-applying average rates will exist.  Learning by doing will not correct the error, 
but software that explicitly determines effective marginal rates and, more 
importantly, frames this rate as the fraction of the next $100 or $1000 earned that 
goes to federal taxes could help mitigate this problem. 
 
V.  Tax Planning Software Today 
 
 Tax preparation software is now ubiquitous.  In a 2014 hearing, the 
Commissioner of the IRS reported that 34% of individual filers utilized tax 
preparation software, while another 56% turned to professional preparers, almost all 
of whom would have utilized software to prepare these returns.164  That leaves about 
10% of individual taxpayers using paper and pencil.  While the software providers 
seem to be focused primarily on tax preparation products, many also offer tax 
planning products.  Our research revealed 39 tax planning software products on the 
market today.165   
 
 Tax planning software ranges from simplistic to highly sophisticated.  The 
most sophisticated products are marketed to professional preparers who advise 
multiple taxpayers.  In many cases, professional planning software is integrated with 
tax preparation software or the preparer can export data from the preparation 
software to the planning software.  If broadly utilized, the most sophisticated tax 
planning software available today would go some way towards restoring the 
functional transparency of the tax system.  However, the products currently offered 
to individual taxpayers certainly do not meet that standard, and the extent to which 
professional preparers use planning software to improve their clients understanding 
of the tax system is unclear. 
 
 There is great variety in the functionality of tax planning software, and the line 
between tax preparation software and tax planning software is murky.  Consider 
products like TurboTax and TaxAct.166  These are tax preparation software products 
aimed at individual taxpayers eschewing the use of professional preparers.  The 
emphasis is on ensuring that users identify all possible deductions and credits (as 
well as income items, of course) for the current tax year, so as to avoid paying more 
                                                        
constant or even declining marginal rates”).  But the demogrant approach to 
progressivity is likely to be a non-starter politically. 
164 Protecting Taxpayers from Incompetent and Unethical Return Preparers: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 113th Cong. (2014) (testimony of John A. Koskinen, 
Comm'r of Internal Revenue Service), 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Koskinen%20Testimony.pdf (cited 
in Blank & Osofsky (2017). 
165 A list of these products is provided in the Appendix.  This list does not include a 
number of tax preparation software products that include no tax planning functions. 
166  INTUIT TURBOTAX, https://turbotax.intuit.com/(last visited on July 11, 
2020);TaxAct, https://www.taxact.com/ (last visited on July 11, 2020).  
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tax than is owed.  These products include numerous prompts to help users identify 
allowable credits and deductions, and these prompts serve an educative function in 
addition to their primary function of minimizing reported taxable income.167  These 
products could even be used to run “what if” scenarios to illuminate the impact of 
various life decisions on tax burdens, but these products are not designed for this 
function and using them in this manner would be inconvenient, to say the least.  Aside 
from alerting users to current year deductions and credits, these programs do nothing 
to highlight tax incentives or issues that might be on the horizon.   
 
 The makers of both TurboTax and TaxAct offer rudimentary tax planning 
software as well.  TurboTax offers TaxCaster, which it bills as a tax refund 
estimator. 168   TaxCaster is a free, stand-alone product.  It is not integrated with 
TurboTax’s preparation software, and it allows users to input various items of income 
and expense, withholding, and other information that it uses to generate a bottom line 
tax owed/refunded figure.  Because TaxCaster utilizes fewer fields than TurboTax, it 
is conceivably easier to use for simple tax planning.  However, a user cannot adjust 
inputs without starting the process over, so TaxCaster’s utility in this service is 
limited.  The product seems to exist largely as advertising for TurboTax’s tax 
preparation software. 
 
 TaxAct offers a simplistic but potentially educative Tax Bracket Calculator that 
determines a user’s statutory marginal and average tax rates based on seven inputs 
as well as a 30 field Tax Refund Calculator that allows users to vary inputs and 
recalculate tax owed.  This product could be used to run “what if” scenarios by 
taxpayers with relatively simple tax situations.169   
 
The bottom line, however, is that “tax planning” products aimed at individual 
taxpayers do not provide the tools needed to render the Code functionally 
transparent.  Tax planning software marketed to professional preparers, on the other 
hand, is much more powerful.   
 
The leading products in this class, including Lacerte Tax Planner, CCH 
ProSystem fx Planning, and Drake Tax Planner, are sophisticated, integrated planning 
                                                        
167 To provide just a few examples, TaxAct’s input screens note that contributions to 
a traditional IRA can reduce taxes, while contributions to a Roth IRA would not, 
highlight the floor on deductions for medical expenses, and explain that itemized 
deductions are only useful to the extent they exceed the standard deduction. Tax 
Software Pro Tips Advice, TAXACT, https://www.taxact.com/.  TurboTax’s input 
screens provide similarly useful and educative notes. Input Screens ExplainWhy, 
Turbo Tax, https://turbotax.intuit.com/.   
168 Income Tax Calculator 2019: Taxcaster, INTUIT TURBOTAX (last visited on July 11, 
2020), https://turbotax.intuit.com/tax-tools/calculators/taxcaster/. 
169 Taxpayers with more complex situations would likely be stymied by, for example, 
the prompt to enter their qualified business income deduction. 
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products. 170   Because these products are offered to professional preparers, who 
presumably know the tax laws, there is relatively less emphasis on providing the 
kinds of educative tax “tips” that one finds in TurboTax and TaxAct.  But this function 
is not entirely absent either, and, because these planning products are integrated with 
tax preparation software or start with data exported from taxpayer returns, these tips 
are not generic, but are tailored to particular taxpayer circumstances.171   
 
Planning software aimed at professional preparers generally provides little 
guidance with respect to tax incentives that lie beyond the immediate horizon of the 
current tax year and next.  I found no examples of software that would alert a preparer 
with respect to education credits that might soon come into play for a taxpayer with 
a teenage child, for example.  This is not too surprising, given that the audience for 
these products is professional preparers who would not typically need this kind of 
prompt to have a conversation with their clients about topics such as this.  This should 
be bread and butter work for tax advisors. 
 
Where the best planning products really shine, however, is in facilitating “what 
if” planning.  Again, because these products are integrated with tax preparation 
software, they start with a taxpayer’s actual tax situation and allow preparers to 
hypothetically adjust for a new job, a new child, a move to a different state, etc., and 
quickly and easily compare the tax consequences of the various scenarios.   Lacerte, 
for example, boasts that its planning software allows preparers to “compare multiple, 
complex scenarios using actual current and future year tax rates.”172  CCH ProSystem 
fx Planning allows a planner to “forecast and compare up to 30 different tax scenarios 
with 8 years of projection data per plan.”173  These products even include features 
allowing preparers to quickly prepare reports for their clients including charts 
comparing the outcomes of various scenarios.174 
 
 To what extent does tax planning software bring clarity to the black box of 
federal income taxation today?  Software aimed at individuals preparing their own 
returns – both preparation and planning software – serves an educative function by 
                                                        
170 See e.g. Lacerte, INTUIT, proconnect.intuit.com/Lacerte, (last accessed on July 17, 
2020); CCH ProSystem fx Suite, WOLTERS KLUWER, 
https://taxna.wolterskluwer.com/professional-tax-software/prosystem-fx (last 
accessed on July 17, 2020); DRAKE SOFTWARE, drakesoftware.com, (last accessed on 
July 17, 2020).  
171 For example, in its marketing materials, Lacerte provides an analysis of the tax 
return for a hypothetical taxpayer that highlights unused opportunities to reduce tax 
by, e.g., fully participating in qualified retirement plans, accelerating certain itemized 
deductions, or even employing a child under the age of 18 in the family business. 
172 https://proconnect.intuit.com/lacerte/integrations/tax-planner/. 
173  Wolters Kluwer, CCH ProSystem fx Planning Fact Sheet; 
file:///Users/diwalker/Downloads/cch_prosystem_fx_planning_fact_sheet_2018_02
20%20(1).pdf. 
174 Wolters Kluwer, CCH ProSystem fx Planning Fact Sheet 
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highlighting generic tax tips and providing simple bracket analyses.  This software is 
focused, however, on identifying current tax year deductions and credits and 
estimating or determining tax.  This software is not useful for conducting “what if” 
scenario analysis or for calling taxpayers’ attention to tax incentives that may be 
approaching on the horizon.  These products certainly simplify compliance, but users 
are still likely to see the tax system as a black box. 
 
  Professional preparers could bring clarity to their clients by combining their 
knowledge and experience with the sophisticated planning products at their disposal.  
Their knowledge and experience would allow them to advise their clients with 
respect to tax provisions with which their clients may not be aware, and the planning 
software would allow them to easily illuminate the tax consequences of various life 
decisions their clients face.  Given this, one might expect that taxpayers who utilize 
professional preparers would be better informed.  But as several commentators have 
observed, the use of professional preparers may actually reduce taxpayer awareness 
of tax considerations if taxpayers essentially delegate return preparation and filing to 
professional preparers.175   
 
The limited empirical evidence supports this more pessimistic view.  In a 
survey-based study of taxpayer awareness of their marginal tax rates reported in 
1995, Rupert and Fischer found that taxpayers who used professional preparers were 
less accurate than other taxpayers in estimating EMTRs.176  More recently, Ballard 
and Gupta surveyed 978 adult residents of Michigan soliciting their estimation of 
their average federal income tax rate.177  Almost 85% of respondents over-estimated 
their ATRs, with mean over-estimation of 11.6 percentage points.178  Respondents 
who reported using a professional preparer over-estimated their ATRs by nearly 3 
percentage points more than self-preparers, all else equal.179 
 
Before concluding this Part, I would be remiss if I did not mention one very 
different and very promising technological advance in tax analysis offered by Blue J. 
Legal.180  Blue J. Legal harnesses artificial intelligence and big data to predict the 
result of difficult borderline tax questions such as whether a financial instrument 
would be characterized as debt or equity or whether a worker would be classified as 
an employee or independent contractor.  To be sure, Blue J. Legal is itself a black box, 
but the software provides probabilities that its characterizations are correct and 
allows users to test various sensitivities, which assists in effective planning and 
structuring.  Although as currently configured, Blue J. Legal is targeted at a specific 
                                                        
175 Rupert & Fischer at 40; Feldman & Katuscak at 3. 
176 Rupert and Fischer at 51 (survey of 108 taxpayers who responded to a survey 
instrument and provided tax return information). 
177 Ballard & Gupta at 270. 
178 Ballard & Gupta at 264. 
179 Ballard & Gupta at 278-79. 
180 BLUE J. LEGAL, https://www.bluejlegal.com/ (last visited on Aug. 2, 2020). 
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set of difficult questions and is not a multi-purpose tax planning tool, it suggests an 
alternative path forward for tax planning technology.181  
 
VI.  The Case for Government Provided Tax Planning Software 
 
 Even without AI, existing technology seems sufficient to restore functional 
transparency to the increasingly complex tax system.  Planning software currently 
available to professional preparers is more than adequate for “what if” scenario 
analysis that would not only calculate a taxpayer’s EMTR in various situations but 
would explain the relationship between life decisions and tax in a fashion that is easily 
digestible and actionable.  And it would be straightforward to add individually 
tailored prompts highlighting tax incentives that are currently available or that may 
be on the horizon.  One can think of this as a combination of professional preparer 
planning software and professional preparer experience and foresight.  This 
combination of information could mitigate the black box nature of our tax system to 
a significant degree, for good or ill. 
 
 This Part of the Article presents the case for government provision of just such 
software.  The argument, in brief, is that the development of such technology and its 
availability to high-income taxpayers are probably inevitable, and as a result the 
downsides of widely available software are to some extent unavoidable, but that 
government provision can help shape the technology in ways that increase social 
welfare and improve distributional outcomes.  I also argue that government provided 
planning software should be targeted at low- to middle-income taxpayers in order to 
avoid facilitating social welfare reducing tax planning by high-income taxpayers and 
to level the tax planning playing field for lower-income taxpayers. 
 
I am not the first to advocate government provided tax software.  In a 1999 
article, Joshua Rosenberg envisioned government provided tax preparation software 
that would be focused on accurate compliance and would highlight tax incentives. 182  
Like me, Rosenberg viewed government provided software as a response to the 
increasing complexity and opacity of the Code.183  More recently and further afield 
but in a similar spirit, Marjorie Kornhauser proposed in 2005 that the IRS provide 
taxpayers with an annual statement of their income tax burden, similar to the 
statement we receive annually from the Social Security Administration. 184   This 
statement would highlight key data, such as gross income, deductions, taxable 
income, and credits and provide and explain the difference between the taxpayer’s 
                                                        
181 Ben Alarie, one of the founders of Blue J. Legal foresees AI reducing the cost of 
information and increasing the democratization of tax law.  Alarie (Law in Future).  I 
am less sanguine.  The fact that technology is available does not mean that it will 
become affordable and ubiquitous. 
182 Rosenberg at 42, 51. 
183 Rosenberg at 51. 
184 Kornhauser (2005) at 106-07. 
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ATR and MTR.185  In many ways, the government provided tax planning software 
envisioned here is a high-tech extension of Kornhauser’s proposal. 
 
A. Further Development/Proliferation of Tax Planning Software Likely is 
Inevitable 
 
Given the increasing complexity of the Code, the increasing power of 
technology, and the amount of money (and leisure) at stake, it is probably inevitable 
that tax software vendors will continue to develop and to market planning software.  
In fact, it is surprising that sophisticated tax planning software is not currently 
marketed to high-income individuals.  Intuit, for example, offers such software to 
professional preparers through its Lacerte line, but offers nothing comparable to 
individuals utilizing its TurboTax line of products.186   
 
 Why is this?  The answer has to be that individual purchasers of tax 
preparation software don’t yet demand this kind of analysis.  Perhaps taxpayers who 
want this information receive it indirectly from professional preparers.  And, indeed, 
there must be demand for these services by the clients of professional preparers, or 
Lacerte, Drake, CCH and the other vendors of professional tax software would not 
include these features in their products either.   
 
 Meanwhile, a number of technology savvy commentators envision a future in 
which technology will have a much more dramatic influence on tax and other areas 
of the law.  Ben Alarie, for example, predicts that technological advances will lead to 
increasing democratization of the law as lower costs of producing information will 
make it less expensive to understand legal rights and obligations.187  
 
 If this is right, if we are approaching “legal singularity” in Alarie’s evocative 
phrasing, 188  then the costs of achieving functional transparency – principally 
increased excess burden and cheating – are likely unavoidable.  If so, the important 
questions have to do with who shapes the innovation and for whose benefit.  
 
B. IRS Tax Planning Software Could Be Designed to Advance Government 
Policies 
 
 Commercial tax planning software will be designed to maximize revenue for 
the vendor, which likely translates into software that maximizes the utility of the 
software’s end users.  There is no reason that vendors would take into account overall 
                                                        
185 Kornhauser at 107-08. 
186 TurboTax offers Free, Deluxe, Premium, and Self-Employed editions, which are 
increasingly costly. The higher-end products tackle increasingly complicated tasks, 
such as dealing with securities transactions, but none offer the “what if” scenario 
analysis found in Lacerte. 
187 Alarie (Law in Future) at 426. 
188 Alarie (Path) at 443. 
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social welfare in designing such software, but the government could.  This section 
highlights several ways in which government designed and provided tax planning 
software could focus on meeting government and social welfare objectives that 
commercial products might not.   
 
1. Increasing the Efficacy of Tax Incentives 
 
 The Code contains numerous clear-cut tax incentives aimed at individual 
taxpayers. 189  Given the complexity and opacity of the Code, many taxpayers are 
unaware of these incentives or fail to take full advantage.  For example, 20% of 
taxpayers eligible for the EITC fail to claim the credit, primarily because they fail to 
file returns.190  As Jacob Goldin notes, incomplete EITC take-up means that many 
individuals fail to receive the EITC tax benefit and in all likelihood “at least some 
individuals are not aware of the pro-work incentives the credit creates, and hence, 
work less than they would if they were to take the credit’s incentives into account.”191  
Presumably, Congress would prefer full take-up and more effective incentives. 192  
Because EITC eligible taxpayers who file returns typically use professional preparers 
or tax preparation software that ensures that the taxpayer will receive her full credit, 
Goldin argues that “efforts to increase EITC take-up should focus on inducing EITC-
eligible individuals to file a tax return.”193   
 
 This prescription makes sense as a means of ensuring that individuals receive 
the EITC to which they are entitled, but encouraging filing alone would not ensure 
that individuals understand and respond to the EITC’s work incentives.  Suppose, for 
example, that a federal EITC-capable pre-populated return system were to be 
established.  Such a system would largely mitigate computational complexity and 
ensure payment of full EITC benefits to workers with W-2 earnings reported to the 
IRS, 194  but it would not provide the information that individuals need to make 
informed decisions about work effort.  It would not even ensure that EITC recipients 
were aware of the credit at all. 
 
 In order to ensure that tax incentives are as effective as possible, individuals 
need to be made aware of the incentives and brought to understand how their 
potential responses to the incentives would affect their after-tax income.  
                                                        
189 See supra TAN x. 
190 Goldin (2018) at 60-61, 70. 
191 Goldin at 66. 
192 The government spends hundreds of millions of dollars a year on EITC outreach 
and enforcement.  See Bhargava & Manoli at 3523 (cited in Goldin (2018)) (reporting 
that Congress appropriated $716 million in 1997 for EITC outreach and enforcement 
over a five-year period). 
193 Goldin at 107. 
194 Workers with self-employment income not reported to the government by third 
parties would not be issued pre-populated returns and might continue to miss out on 
the EITC. 
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Government provided planning software could (1) alert individuals that they are or 
may be eligible for various incentives, and (2) allow these individuals to quickly and 
easily calculate the after-tax income associated with their potential responses to the 
incentive.   
  
 If a taxpayer can be induced to use government provided tax planning 
software that accesses her tax return data, the first step – alerting the taxpayer as to 
incentive eligibility – is fairly trivial.  The software could be designed to determine 
whether, based on her reported income and other reported characteristics, e.g., 
number and age of dependent children, the taxpayer is eligible or close to being 
eligible for the various discrete federal income tax incentives – the EITC, education 
credits, retirement credits, etc.  And the software presumably could be designed to 
make these determinations automatically and prompt the taxpayer without the need 
for an affirmative inquiry.195 
 
 To be sure, simply making such software available does not solve the 
particular EITC take-up problem highlighted by Goldin.  EITC-eligible individuals who 
fail to file returns are unlikely to utilize tax planning software to determine how much 
money they are leaving on the table.  It is conceivable, although somewhat big 
brother-ish, that the IRS would use third party reported income data to alert non-
filers as to the possibility that they would be eligible for the EITC and direct them to 
simple tax planning software that would provide a more definitive answer.196 
  
 The second step – associating potential responses to incentives with after-tax 
income – falls squarely within the domain of current professional tax planning 
software and specifically “what if” scenario analysis and can clearly be accomplished 
with current technology.197  In the EITC example, the software could provide the 
taxpayer with her current tax credit based on her current income and with the credit 
she would receive if her income were to increase or decrease by, say, 10%.   
 
                                                        
195 Sophisticated tax planning software products marketed to professional taxpayers 
today automatically conduct these sorts of analyses and provide alerts.  E.g. Tax 
Planner Pro, INTUIT, 
https://quickbooks.intuit.com/app/apps/appdetails/taxplanner/en-us/ (last 
visited on July 11, 2020); Lacerte, INTUIT, https://proconnect.intuit.com/lacerte/ (last 
visited on July 11, 2020) (including a deduction finder); ProConnect, INTUIT, 
https://proconnect.intuit.com/tax-online/ (last visited on July 11, 2020) (using pop-
ups to show potential deductions or credits); Checkpoint, THOMSON REUTERS, 
tax.thomsonreuters.com/checkpoint (last visited on July 11, 2020); ATX, WOLTERS 
KUWLER, https://taxna.wolterskluwer.com/professional-tax-software/atx (last 
visited on July 11, 2020). 
196  Again, this process would not assist taxpayers eligible for the EITC based on 
income from self employment that is not reported to the IRS by third parties. 
197 See supra TAN x. 
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Of course, there are potential downsides to such a program.  Continuing with 
the EITC example, first, total EITC benefits would likely increase, but, to the extent 
that this is a product of greater work effort, we should count this as a feature, not a 
bug.  Second, making it easier for taxpayers to understand how the EITC works could 
increase cheating.  If it is easier for an EITC recipient to determine the income level 
that maximizes her credit in her particular situation, she may be more likely to report 
that level of income.  Third, as Goldin notes, some behavioral responses increase 
deadweight loss, in this case that would include the negative impact of the EITC phase 
out on work incentives.198  I will address these concerns in subsequent sections. 
 
 2. Highlighting Cases in Which EMTR is Less than STR 
 
 While tax expenditure provisions more often result in EMTRs exceeding STRs 
because of phase outs, there are cases in which the opposite is true and when it would 
be in the interest of the taxpayer and society for the taxpayer to recognize this 
situation and increase her labor supply.  Government planning software could be 
designed to expressly highlight these situations and illustrate to the taxpayer that her 
after-tax income may be a larger fraction of pre-tax income than she had realized.  One 
example of this phenomenon, of course, is the EITC phase in that we have just 
discussed.199  In the EITC phase-in range, taxpayers’ EMTRs are significantly lower 
than STRs.200  Taxpayers who fail to understand this and believe their tax rate to be 
the STR (or in some cases the highest STR, which may be more salient) may be leaving 
money on the table personally and creating needless deadweight loss.   
 
 At the opposite end of the income spectrum, AMT paying taxpayers who are 
not subject to the AMT exemption phase out (because the phase out has not been 
triggered or because their exemptions have been fully phased out) also likely face an 
EMTR that is less than their STR.201  Again, both individual utility and social welfare 
are improved if these taxpayers are made aware of the lower EMTR and respond 
accordingly.  Simple tax planning software can alert taxpayers to these circumstances 
and illustrate the relationship between pre- and post-tax income, correcting 
misperceptions and increasing social welfare.   
 
 3.  Not Highlighting Cases in Which EMTR Exceeds STR 
  
 What about situations in which a taxpayer’s EMTR exceeds her STR?  This will 
commonly be the case for taxpayers whose itemized deductions are curtailed by a 
floor or whose income places them in the phase-out range for one or more provisions 
such as the EITC, the AMT, education credits, etc.  In these cases, a taxpayer who 
understood her true EMTR might work less than she would under the mistaken belief 
                                                        
198 Goldin at 62-62. 
199 Another is the refundable portion of the child tax credit.  See supra TAN x. 
200 See supra TAN x. 
201 Recall that the nominal rates under the AMT are less than the highest rates under 
the regular income tax. 
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that her STR was her EMTR, improving her personal utility but increasing the 
aggregate deadweight loss from taxation.  Presumably, commercially available 
software would treat the two cases – cases in which the EMTR exceeds the STR and 
cases in which the EMTR is less than the STR – symmetrically, promoting individual 
utility maximization in both cases and ignoring social welfare.  Must government 
provided software take the same tack?  Probably, but not necessarily.  Let me 
elaborate. 
 
 Clearly, the government cannot misrepresent the tax laws to taxpayers.  If a 
taxpayer in a phase-out range uses government provided software to determine the 
marginal impact of additional income, the software must provide the correct answer.  
But must the software prompt the taxpayer that her income places her in a phase-out 
range and, as a result, her EMTR may be higher than she realizes?  The argument that 
the software must alert the taxpayer would likely be grounded in an implicit promise 
that the software would promote individual optimization.  Some might argue that if 
the software alerts taxpayers to incentives that benefit the government and society, 
in fairness it must highlight incentives that do not benefit the government and society.   
 
But there are at least two possible counter arguments.  First, the IRS could 
simply disclaim any such obligation.  Taxpayers would not be bound to use the IRS’s 
software, and the software could clearly indicate what it is designed to do and not to 
do.  Second, in some cases the symmetry may be false.  Explicit tax expenditures, such 
as the EITC, education credits, retirement incentives, and the like, which the 
government would want to affirmatively highlight, are different in kind than the 
phase out of the AMT exemption amounts, which is, in effect, a rate adjustment.  To 
be sure, some would argue that the government’s obligation to highlight hidden tax 
rate adjustments, such as the phase out of AMT exemptions, personal exemptions, or 
itemized deductions, should actually be greater, but the government has never been 
obligated to highlight the impact of these phase outs and it is not clear why 
government provision of planning software would impose such an obligation.202  
 
 Ultimately, however, I suspect that the asymmetric treatment of tax incentives 
and disincentives would be a nonstarter politically and thus untenable.  And there is, 
to be sure, one other constraint on the IRS’s ability to shape tax planning software to 
serve social welfare instead of personal welfare.  As noted above, 203  use of this 
software is voluntary.  If taxpayers, specifically high-income taxpayers, do not believe 
that the government’s software serves their interest they can purchase a commercial 
product, or given the current dearth of sophisticated planning software marketed to 
individuals, consult a tax professional for advice.   
 
                                                        
202 I use the personal exemption, itemized deduction, and AMT exemption phase outs 
as familiar examples recognizing that the first two are currently inapplicable and that 
the AMT and AMT exemption phase outs currently apply to only a very small number 
of taxpayers. 
203 See supra TAN x. 
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Given this reality, and in order to avoid facilitating social welfare reducing 
planning by high-income taxpayers, the better and more achievable course might be 
to target government provided planning software at low- to middle-income 
taxpayers.  The following sections provide other potential justifications for such 
targeting. 
 
C. IRS Provision of Tax Planning Software Could Improve Distribution 
 
 As noted above, while vendors do not market sophisticated tax planning 
software to individual taxpayers, they do market such software to professional 
preparers who presumably use these features in advising their clients.204  Reliance 
on professional preparers is not limited to high-income taxpayers.  Principally 
because of the complexity of the EITC, many low-income taxpayers turn to 
professionals, as well.  Logic and intuition suggest, however, that high-income clients 
would make greater use of scenario planning services offered by their preparers than 
low-income clients because more dollars would generally be at stake and because 
high-income taxpayers would be better able to pay for additional planning services 
beyond simple tax preparation. 
 
 If this is an accurate portrayal, and I admit, that this is speculative, this pattern 
would be troubling from a distributional perspective.  High-income taxpayers who 
receive and act on accurate information about the tax consequences of their life 
decisions will make more utility-enhancing decisions than low-income taxpayers who 
fail to utilize these services.  By providing free planning software to low-income 
taxpayers, the IRS could level this playing field. 
 
 In recent work, Manoj Viswanathan argues that the IRS should support low-
income tax planning.205  He argues that low-income tax planning is more likely to be 
welfare enhancing than high-income planning and that, even when it isn’t, it’s unfair 
for low-income taxpayers not to be able to plan when high-income taxpayers do.206  
Viswanathan notes that the TCJA introduced complex provisions that apply to low-
income taxpayers, such as §199A, and he encourages the IRS to sponsor programs to 
advise these taxpayers ex ante.207  Government provision of simple, user-friendly tax 
planning software to low-income taxpayers would be perfectly consistent with this 
effort. 
 
 But there may be an even stronger argument for government provision of 
planning software to low-income individuals.  Given numerous phase outs of tax 
expenditures targeted at lower-income taxpayers, the Code may be more of a black 
                                                        
204 See supra TAN x. 
205 Viswanathan at 195. 
206 Viswanathan at 203. 
207 Viswanathan at 210-211 (suggesting, for example, that law school clinics “could 
and should provide tax planning assistance for low-income taxpayers beyond what 
[low-income tax preparation assistance] centers currently provide”). 
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box for these taxpayers than for middle- and upper-income taxpayers.  So the need 
may be greater.  Moreover, while I support the adoption of pre-populated return 
programs, I recognize that if these programs become reality, the Code will become 
even more of a black box for the typically lower-income taxpayers who would be 
eligible to participate, again increasing the need and justification for government 
provided planning software. 
 
D. Getting the IRS into the Tax Preparation Software Game 
 
 In 2002, the IRS entered into the Free Online Electronic Tax Filing Agreement 
with the Free File Alliance, a collection of vendors of tax preparation software 
products. 208  The vendors committed to providing free tax preparation and filing 
software through the IRS’s website for 60% of U.S. taxpayers.209  The IRS committed 
to stay out of the tax preparation software business.  Although the term of the 
agreement has been extended several times, 210  the program has not lived up to 
expectations.  A recent report issued by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration found that only 2.4% of 104 million eligible taxpayers utilized the 
program and filed their returns for free, while 33.2% of these taxpayers filed using 
Alliance members’ commercial software products. 211   One reason for a lack of 
taxpayer participation, the Inspector General found, was that some Free File Alliance 
members edited the code in their Free File web pages to ensure that taxpayers 
searching the Internet for free return filing would not find the members’ Free File 
page. 212   More generally, the Inspector General attributed this low level of 
participation in the Free File program to “complexity, confusion, and lack of taxpayer 
awareness about [the program’s] operation and requirements.”213   
 
 Undoubtedly, integrated tax preparation and tax planning software is more 
efficient and effective than stand-alone products.  Perhaps this is the moment for the 
IRS to abandon the Free File Program and get into the tax preparation software game.  
The IRS could provide tax preparation software as well as planning software targeted 
at lower-income taxpayers who, phase outs aside, typically face less complex tax 
situations. 214   The combination of products would focus on achieving accurate 
                                                        
208 Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Staff Memorandum, IRA Oversight of 
Free File Program 1 (June 9, 2020). 
209 PSI Staff Memo at 1. 
210 PSI Staff Memo at 1-2 (noting that the 2005 extension expanded coverage to 70% 
of taxpayers. 
211 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, Complexity and Insufficient 
Oversight of the Free File Program Result in Low Taxpayer Participation 4-5 (Feb. 3, 
2020). 
212 TIGTA at 9-10. 
213 TIGTA, Highlights. 
214  Whether the IRS creates tax preparation software or not, any IRS planning 
software should be designed to receive data directly from commercial preparation 
products such as TurboTax. 
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compliance but also promoting functional transparency of the tax system, particularly 
for low-income taxpayers who are less likely to have access to affordable commercial 
services.215   
 
E. The Costs of Government Provided Tax Planning Software  
 
 Part III of this Article described several positive aspects of increased 
complexity and opacity – supporting a more accurate tax system, reducing distortions 
in taxpayer behavior and deadweight loss, and reducing cheating.  Effective 
government provided planning software that restored functional transparency would 
undermine the second and third of these benefits of complexity, resulting in greater 
deadweight loss and more cheating.   
 
 To be sure, these downsides are not unique to government provided planning 
software.  Commercial planning software already exists that implicates these costs.  
But by definition, if government provided software achieves greater penetration, 
more taxpayers will understand and presumably act upon the various incentives 
embedded in the Code, some by reducing work effort when they realize that their 
EMTR is significantly higher than they believed, some by mis-reporting income from 
self-employment in order to maximize receipt of tax benefits.  These, then, are the 
behavioral costs of government provided software.  Obviously, there would be 
additional costs of software development, promulgation, and maintenance. 
 
F.  Summing Up the Case for Targeting Government Provided Planning Software 
at Lower-Income Taxpayers 
 
 In sum, while the government could endeavor to provide tax planning 
software to all taxpayers, high income taxpayers already have access to commercial 
planning software through professional preparers and the resources to command 
these services.  The need is greater at the lower end of the income spectrum.  
Moreover, increasing functional transparency through the provision of planning 
software will likely lead to greater deadweight loss, particularly at the higher end of 
the income spectrum, as, absent transparency, high-income taxpayers tend to under-
estimate their EMTRs as a result of various deduction and credit floors and phaseouts.  
To be sure, increasing functional transparency for lower-income taxpayers will also 
increase deadweight loss in some cases, but not in all cases given various phase-in 
provisions applicable to low income taxpayers.  Weighing the costs and benefits 
suggests that targeting government provided planning software at low-income 
taxpayers may be the most sensible path forward.  
 
VII.  Further Discussion of Planning Software as a Response to Tax Complexity 
 
                                                        
215  Rosenberg (1999) (advocating IRS promulgation of tax preparation software 
focused on achieving accurate compliance). 
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 As I’ve argued above, technological responses to tax complexity are probably 
inevitable.  Indeed, they exist today for some taxpayers, and one would think that 
their use would increase as tax complexity grows and the cost of technology falls.  If 
so, the important questions going forward are 1) who gets to shape these responses 
– the government or private parties? And 2) who will be in a position to take 
advantage of this technology – all taxpayers or just high-income taxpayers who can 
afford the bill? 
 
 For the moment, however, let’s envision a world in which planning software – 
commercial and/or government provided – is widely available and broadly used, 
creating functional transparency for many taxpayers.  I have discussed the 
implications for tax efficiency and distribution, but other questions remain.  Does the 
functional transparency generated by planning software address the all of the 
concerns created by complexity? 
 
 Joshua Blank and Leigh Osofsky have noted that the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 
commits the IRS to a certain level of transparency, a commitment that in their view is 
not being met today.216  Would government provision of planning software meet this 
commitment?  Does this commitment require that taxpayers be able to understand 
how phase outs work or is it sufficient that they be able to easily associate life 
decisions with their tax burden?  Is functional transparency, in other words, sufficient 
to meet the IRS’s commitment?  Although the Taxpayer Bill of Rights speaks of the 
right to “clear explanations of the laws,” which might suggest a sort of granular clarity, 
the underlying commitment is to a right to be informed.217  In my view, the kind of 
functional transparency that can be achieved through the sophisticated tax planning 
software I’ve described above should be sufficient to meet that commitment. 
 
   Other complexity-related concerns lie in the political and philosophical 
spheres.  Would widespread availability of planning software sufficiently address the 
democratization, political accountability, and autonomy concerns arising from 
complexity and opacity?  Would government-provided software more adequately 
address these concerns than leaving all of this to the marketplace?  Is it a sufficient 
response to these concerns that taxpayers can readily associate life decisions with tax 
burdens even if they do not choose (or perhaps pay) to do so?   
 
 Here I am somewhat more skeptical.  Take political accountability, for 
example.  One concern is that policy makers can raise taxes surreptitiously by, for 
example, phasing out deductions and avoid the ire of taxpayers who are hoodwinked 
into thinking that their marginal rates and perhaps average rates are lower than they 
are in reality.  With planning software, taxpayers can easily determine their true 
EMTR and ATR, and those who do so would not be hoodwinked.  But even if free, easy, 
                                                        
216  Blank & Osofsky (2017) at 194,199 (arguing that IRS publications engage in 
“simplexity,” simplified descriptions that “have the unintended effect of obscuring 
individuals’ knowledge of the underlying tax law”).  
217 IRS, Taxpayer Bill of Rights: #1, The Right to be Informed. 
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and effective planning software were readily available, would taxpayers use the 
software to figure this out?  Software makes it easier for an interested citizen to cut 
through the opacity, but does nothing to combat the persistent misapprehensions of 
the lazy taxpayer-voter in the face of surreptitious tax increases.218   
 
 It is also unclear that planning software would sufficiently address the 
leviathan or fiscal illusion concerns of some commentators.  Of course, as noted 
above, not all commentators are concerned with exploitation of tax provisions with 
low political salience.219  But if one shares these concerns, one might fairly conclude 
that planning software has greater promise as a tool for addressing the adverse 
impact of complexity on decision making and tax incentives than on political 
accountability and the size of government. 
 
VIII.  Conclusion 
 
 Our complex and opaque tax system has been described as a black box.  In 
reality it is more of a gray translucent box.  The black box label is appropriately placed 
on algorithms derived from the application of machine learning to big data.  The 
algorithms are said to flow from a black box because “they discern patterns and make 
predictions in a way that cannot be intuitively understood or explained in the same 
way that conventional analysis can be.”220 
 
 Our tax system is complex and opaque, but it is not like a machine learning 
black box.  The result of any tax calculation can be explained if one is willing to take 
the time and make the effort.221  But individual Code provisions and the interplay of 
provisions can be extraordinarily complicated.  And while compliance is made 
manageable by the use of tax preparation software and professional preparers (and 
possibly in the future by distribution of pre-populated returns), these “solutions” may 
leave taxpayers in the dark with respect to the underlying tax law. 
 
I have argued that planning software can be used to restore functional 
transparency to the Code, alerting taxpayers to various tax incentives and allowing 
                                                        
218 Perhaps, however, journalists or other intermediaries could use planning software 
to educate taxpayers and voters who lack the motivation to do the analyses 
themselves.  
219 See supra TAN x. 
220 Coglianese & Lehr at 14. 
221 This is not to suggest that there are no ambiguities in the tax rules applicable to 
individual taxpayers.  It may be ambiguous, for example, whether a certain gig 
economy worker is an employee or an independent contractor, and that 
determination has important tax and other legal consequences.  See Ring and Oei; 
Thomas.  See also, Blank and Osofsky, Simplexity (explaining that the IRS often 
presents complex and ambiguous tax questions as simple and clear cut).  However, 
the computational complexity associated with floors, phase ins and phase outs, and 
the AMT does not arise from ambiguity. 
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taxpayers to associate their life decisions with tax burdens.  This is a different type of 
transparency than that which purportedly existed in the prior “golden age” when tax 
rules were simple, individuals filled out their own returns by hand, and taxpayers 
learned about tax by doing their taxes, and in some ways functional transparency is 
superior.   
 
 But I have also argued that there are costs and benefits to creating this 
functional transparency because there are benefits as well as costs to complexity and 
opacity.  Be that as it may, such software exists today, and its use will only increase as 
complexity increases and as high-income taxpayers realize what’s at stake.   
 
 I have also made the case for government provision of tax planning (and 
preparation) software that would be targeted at low-income taxpayers in order to 
address the particular complexities of taxation at the low end of the income spectrum 
and level the tax planning playing field between high- and low-income taxpayers, 
while avoiding facilitating social welfare reducing tax planning by high-income 
taxpayers.     
 
 Some have argued that technology led us to the complex and opaque tax 
system we have today.222  The primary argument of this Article is that technology can 
help supply the remedy as well as the injury. 
 
  
                                                        
222 See supra TAN x. 
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Tax Software Website 
1. Abacus http://abacus.tax/ 
2. ATX- Wolters Kluwer cchsfs.com 
3. Bloomberg Law: Tax bloomberglaw.com/product/tax 
4. Blue J Legal www.bluejlegal.com 
5. BNA Income Tax Planner (Calc-Q-
Tax) 
www.bna.com/tax 
6. CCH Access Tax-Wolters Kluwer cchgroup.com 




8. Checkpoint-Thomson Reuters tax.thomsonreuters.com/checkpoint 
9. Clarus R+D clarusrd.com 
10. Comtax https://www.comtaxit.com/ 
11. Credit Karma creditkarma.com 
12. Drake Software drakesoftware.com 






14. FreeTaxUSA freetaxusa.com 
15. Genius Software https://saginfotech.com/ 
16. GoSystem Rs-Thomson Reuters tax.thomsonreuters.com/gosystem 
17. H&R Block hrblock.com 
18. inDinero indinero.com 
19. Jackson Hewitt https://www.jacksonhewitt.com/ 
20. Lacerte-Intuit proconnect.intuit.com/lacerte 
21. Liberty Tax libertytax.com 
22. Online Taxes OLT.com 
23. OneSource-Thomson Reuters tax.thomsonreuters.com/onesource/tax 
24. Petz Crossling http://www.crosslinktax.com 
25. PowerTax http://www.powertaxsolution.com/ 
26. ProConnect Tax-Intuit proconnect.intuit.com 
27. ProSeries Cloud Hosting https://proconnect.intuit.com/proseries/ 
28. QuickBooks-TaxPlanner Pro https://quickbooks.intuit.com/app/apps/ap
pdetails/taxplanner/en-us/ 








31. TaxAct ww.taxact.com 
32. Taxfyle https://taxfyle.com 
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33. Taxmaster http://www.taxmaster.com/ 
34. TaxSlayer-Professional www.taxslayerpro.com 
35. TaxSlayer-Individual www.taxslayer.com 
36. Taxwise-Wolters Kluwer cchsfs.com 
37. TurboTax-TaxCaster https://turbotax.intuit.com/tax-
tools/calculators/taxcaster/ 
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